It would appear from a note which appears in the draft of the proposed Revised Statutes of British Columbia, at the conclusion of the Acts respecting divorces and matrimonial causes, that in the case of *M., falsely called S.* v. *S.*, reported in B.C. L.R. 25, being a suit for nullity of marriage, it was held by Crease and Gray, JJ., (Begbie, C.J., dissenting) that the Supreme Court of British Columbia has all the jurisdiction conferred on the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, under The Imperial Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, (20 & 21 Vict., c. 85) as amended by 21 & 22 Vict., c. 108. It was thought that the application of the Imperial statutes to British Columbia might have arisen either under the general application of Imperial statute law to the then colony at the time of the passing of the statute, or under an Act passed in British Columbia in 1867, called the English Law Act, which provides that the civil laws of England, as the same existed on the 19th of November, 1858, and so far as the same are not from local circumstances inapplicable, shall be in force in that province. This general enactment left the question for decision by the British Columbia Court, "Is this statute from local circumstances inapplicable?" The Chief Justice held that they were inapplicable; Crease and Gray, JJ., being of a contrary opinion. The case was not argued, except on behalf of the petitioner. It will thus be seen that Chief Justice Davie, in the course he took, followed the lead of the late Chief Justice, and, as there was no argument as against the applicability of the statute, and the judgment being that of a divided Court, in an unargued case, it cannot be said that the subject is res judicata.

It may also be noted that in March, 1891, the full Court, (Begbie, C.J., Crease and Walkem, JJ.) in the case of *Scott* v. *Scott*, held that there was no appeal to the full Court from the decision of a judge granting a decree of divorce, and on that ground they dismissed the appeal, notwithstanding sec. 55 of 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85.

Under the circumstances it is but common prudence that so grave a question should be set right at once. If the jurisdiction exists, there need be no more anxiety; but if it is shown not