America are substantially the
at would induce them to do so
nada, to open a free market for her
ctures. We shall see what success
have with these countries, and if
nents with them be made, how
l work out. It can scarcely be to
est of any of these countries practi-
bind themselves to take only
n manufactures; for if they once
themselves of the competition
the countries from which they
e, and give one country a
l monopoly, they in effect agree
them on the seller's terms. This
lear purchases, which no one will
e, unless he believes that the bar-
sures him an equivalent. What
nts will the United States offer?
ey be real or only apparent? As
manufactures are concerned, the
dvantage would be on the side of
ed States. The latter might take
raw materials of the other countries,
n means manufactures of the former
ceive an undoubted and legitimate
on. But at this point the American
rns upon itself; for in trying protec-
round, there is no room left for free-
proposal to admit raw materials free
ncounter objections from the Ameri-
ner, who is really injured by the
nd who would consider himself in
f being ground between the upper
nether millstone
e whole, the outcome of the Wash-
nternational Conference is doubt-
may lead to some practical results,
he difficulties in the way are many
small.

ANKRUPTCY ANALYSED.

o traders fail?
question, so often asked, receives
answers in different countries,
communities, among different
als. Very interesting replies have
nished in the recent report of the
r-General in Bankruptcy in Eng-
Wales. The failures of 1888 and
years are compared as under:

	No. of Cases.	Liabilities.	Percentage of Assets to Liabilities.
...	4,826	£ 7,110,948	31·5
...	4,839	8,935,825	29·8
...	4,816	7,913,871	36·1
...	4,333	9,037,789	34·2
...	4,170	13,989,995	28·7

spector proposes to show how far
res of the United Kingdom, as
h in the Bankruptcy Courts, are
nisfortune or to causes against
is desirable to provide in any
f bankruptcy administration, and
re they due to causes or accom-
features which it ought to be the
wise legislation to discourage and
To arrive at an answer the
General takes all of the cases, 26
r, in which during the past year
r was adjudicated bankrupt with
of over £25,000. Commenting
developments in these cases, the
am *Journal* finds that "A careful
hem leaves no doubt that only a
l fraction can justly be attributed

to misfortu e; and, apart from cases of actual fraud, the question suggests itself whether the Legislature contemplated the letting loose upon the mercantile community of debtors who have shown themselves so reckless of their neighbours' interests and so incompetent to manage their own affairs." The conclusion of the Inspector-General is that the chief defect of the Bankruptcy Act does not make the bankrupt's discharge sufficiently dependent on his conduct, and here is a point which should not escape the attention of Canadian authorities. Furthermore, he finds that the original influence of the Act in reducing the number of reckless traders is to some extent losing its force owing to the nominal character of the penalties imposed on discharge, while its effects in limiting the extent of their transactions is increasing in consequence of the caution induced by the exposures of the Bankruptcy Court.

The causes given for failure in certain cases are curious, not to say ridiculous. With not a few the weather is a favorite excuse. Thus, an innkeeper fails owing to the long bad winter, and the bad summer of last year is blamed for the collapse of photographers, florists, and drapers. Some debtors attribute their troubles to their large families, while others blame "the expenses of burying their children" for their being unable to pay debts deliberately incurred. "Discontinuance of assistance from friends" is one man's plea, while another says he came to grief through "delay in receiving a legacy." A schoolmaster, alas! lost his connection through "political boycotting," and sadder still, a "gentleman" failed through being "without income"!

The Inspector-General explains that it has not hitherto been possible to estimate the amount of insolvency dealt with outside of the Bankruptcy Act, but under the Deeds of Arrangement Act of 1887, which requires every private deed of arrangement, and the estimated amounts of assets and liabilities in each case, to be registered, that can now be done so far as they are concerned. It appears that the total number of arrangements registered in England and Wales during the past year (which were not upset by subsequent bankruptcy) was 3,495. The liabilities in these cases were £4,803,481, the assets £2,416,755, and the loss to creditors, estimated approximately on the same basis as the cases in bankruptcy, £3,192,-311. After careful examination of the figures the Inspector-General comes to the conclusion that the reduction of the national loss by insolvency since 1883 amounts to something over eight millions sterling, the figures for 1884 being £17,180,449, and for 1888, £8,753,428. The report, which is for the calendar year 1888, takes rather a more cheerful view of commercial conditions and prospects than did that of 1887. The number of receiving orders made and proceeded with during the past year showed a slight decrease, but the liabilities are less, and the assets proportionately larger, the percentage of the one to the other having risen from 29·8 per cent. to 31·5 per cent.

The Inspector-General tells us that:

"The chief features of trading misconduct with which the Bankruptcy Act fails to deal effectively may be summed up as follows:—1. Want of proper book-keeping, leading sometimes to actual fraud, but more generally to a w nt of knowledge on the part of the trader as to his own position and to want of means for investigating his transactions when he comes into the Bankruptcy Court. 2. Trading without capital at the risk of others after knowledge of insolvency, leading to the carrying on of business without reference to the cost of production or to questions of profit and loss, and to the abuse of credit by the manufacture of accommodation bills, and too often by systematic concealment or misrepresentation. 3. Fraudulent preferences on the eve of bankruptcy with a view to protect family and friendly creditors at the expense of the others. 4. Reckless dissipation of assets in the final stages of insolvency."

A WILD SCHEME.

A correspondent sends us a fly-sheet issued by a new kind of an assessment endowment society, hailing from Stratford, Ont. The formidable name of this young giant is, "The Dominion Provident, Benevolent, and Endowment Association." It was incorporated, we read, on the 1st of July, 1889. Therefore very evidently its experience is limited. Its capital is still more so. In fact it seems to have started without any. Mr. S. R. Hesson's name appears as president, and he has the assistance of a first and second vice-president, living respectively at Cobourg and London, while the treasurer, secretary, and managing director all live at Stratford, and are named Dr. Robertson, O. O. Benson, and E. K. Barnsdale. There is no medical examination, because there is no life risk undertaken. Anybody can come in. The sicklier and the older the better, for then all you have paid in, up to the time of death, will belong to the rest of the members, and make their assessments so much the lighter. And if you do not die soon, but get tired of putting your money into it, why so much the better for those who go on shutting their eyes and putting in their money. At least that is the way it appears on the face of it, if the concern lives long enough to give anybody his money back.

Every member must subscribe for $5,000 of benefit, and pay $5.00 for registration, and $6.00 a year in advance for dues, both of which items go for management expenses. His endowment is in the shape of ten coupons of $500 each, to be paid at the end of each four years, or five years, or six years, or seven years, or eight years, as he chooses, and he pays accordingly. For instance, if he wants $500 at the end of each four years, thus getting the last $500 in 40 years, he pays $3 a month till the four years are up, or $144 in all. If there is then $500 in the funds for him and for all others maturing that year, he gets it. If not, all hands must pay extra assessments enough to make up the $500 that is due. If the 8-year term is chosen, then 80 years' faithful contribution of $1.35 per month, or only $1,296, is needed to bring in the whole $5,000 in the shape of $500 at each eight years' end. That $144 will produce $500 in four years looks doubtful, but for $129 to produce $500 in eight years looks most absurd. A good many subscribers will have to contribute to make up the difference, for no ordinary rate of compound interest will half do it. At twelve per cent. compound interest, $16.20 a year—viz., $1.35 per month—will yield only $223.07 in eight years, leaving $276.93 to come from elsewhere to make up the $500 then to be due.

If one puts his money in a savings' bank, it is true he gets only a small interest increase, but he does not lose his principal in case of death. And if he takes an endowment policy in a regular life insurance company, his heirs get far more than the principal in case of his death, even if he lives to make all the payments. But in this affair it is the reverse of that. Death forfeits all claim. None but those who live and persevere get rewarded. Therefore every person becoming a member should be provided against loss by taking a life policy in a responsible company, sufficient to give his heirs as much as his death will cause them to lose by his contributions to this new-fangled "benevolent association."

It strikes us that this Stratford affair is a sort of cheap imitation of the plan of the terrible "Iron Hall," which has left so many mourners in Canada as well as the United States. The "Iron Hall" promises to complete its endowments in exactly seven years, no more and no less, and has paid the first lot of them, but only by using up the money contributed by new members, none of whom are likely to see a dollar of their money back again unless they fall ill pretty soon, and thus get some of it for sick benefits. This sick benefit safety valve of the "Iron Hall" is not attached to the "Provident Benevolent and Endowment Association." Nor are you confined to a seven years' scheme. As we have remarked, you can take your choice all the way from a four-year term with assessments of $3.00 per month, or oftener, to an eight-year term at $1.35 per month or oftener, but in either case the last $500 of the $5,-000 only comes in at the end of the tenth term, whether that be forty or eighty years hence. In any case you must steadily pay $6.00 a year in advance for management expenses, though it looks rather heavy to pay $6.00 for the privilege of paying in $1.35 each month for a year, with such a slight prospect of getting a single baubee of it out again. That means paying $6.00 for being allowed to pay in $16.20. We incline to think that if there are many persons in Ontario willing to pay so much for so little, we shall soon have a hundred, nay several hundred, more "Benevolent" associations operating on the same line. Why not? It is a veritable gold mine for the promoters if a sufficient number of silly persons can be induced to join. Selling whiskey is a slow way of getting rich in comparison with it. If the fish will only bite and take a good firm hold, somebody will get much money without risking much capital. We do not think, however, that the business will prove a success in Ontario, and we do think S. R. Hesson, M.P., might find better use for his name than in fathering a scheme possessing so much of the gambling element.

THERE is some prospect that a company will be formed in Kingston for the manufacture of oilcloths on an extensive scale.