

circles by the Entente—even though its full value to France may never have been realized until after the war had broken out—and the incessant activity of Germany's intriguing diplomacy, with its established policy of international embroilment and its disingenuous methods, we can hardly wonder at the attitude of Sweden to-day. By their isolation within the Scandinavian group, by the apparent or real threats of Russia, by the combination of English and Russian interests, by the intrigues of Germany, and, finally, by the violent agitation of a socially influential pro-German group at home, the Swedes have simply been driven to look upon Germany as their only remaining friend.

No Englishman who has grasped this combination of powerful influences, all of them pressing in the same direction, can fail to respect and admire the restraint shown by the Swedish people since the beginning of the present crisis. No matter what the sympathies of individuals or groups may have been, the behaviour of the nation as a whole has been scrupulously correct, nothing being undertaken in the way of mobilization, for instance, but what was absolutely required for the protection of Swedish neutrality at an extremely critical period. Nor have the Swedes at any time been betrayed into any resentment against England. On the contrary, I have been told by several Englishmen, who have recently passed through Sweden on their way to or from Russia, that they were passed the moment their nationality became known, while the passports and luggage of Germans as well as Russians were carefully examined. To be perfectly frank, however, I do not know what might have happened if the present war had not been preceded by that awakening of the Swedish nation already referred to. The Swedes present a