A SLANDER SPOKEN IN A FOREIGN LANGUAGE.—In the case of *McLeod* v. *McLeod*, tried at Sherbrooke, in the Province of Quebec, and reported in *The Legal News*, the plaintiff had used language in speaking of the defendant which was *prima facie* slanderous. It appearing, however, that the words complained of were spoken in Gaelic, it was objected that, inasmuch as Gaelic is a foreign language, it is not sufficient to set forth the alleged slander by means of an English translation, but that the very words used should be set forth, accompanied by a translation and evidence of its accuracy. The conclusion arrived at was that while there was no Quebec case in point, the English and American authorities undoubtedly sustained the objection. It did not appear that the defendant had used the words set forth in the declaration, but rather that he used certain other words which, when translated into English, may have the same meaning. The action was accordingly dismissed.

RIGHT OF WAY.—In *Whaley* v. *Jarrett*, in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the defendant had a right of way over land belonging to the plaintiff. This right was based on a deed granting "easement of travel and private road privilege." It was held that the plaintiff had a right to erect gates at each end of the way for the protection of his land, such gates being sufficiently wide and conveniently hung, and not interfering with the reasonable enjoyment by the defendant of his right of way. The court thought it settled that, if the land-owner is not restrained by the terms of the grant of a right of way across lands used for agricultural purposes, he may maintain fences across such way, if provided with suitable gates. It is a principle of law that nothing passes as an incident to the grant of an easement, but what is requisite to the fair enjoyment of the privilege. The reasonable use and enjoyment of the way, the court maintained, is quite consistent with the right of the plaintiff to maintain proper gates at the ends of the lane for the protection of the land.

HOW TO GET OUT OF A STEAMSHIP BERTH.—A variety of opinion appears to prevail among Her Majesty's judges, as evidenced by the case of *Andrew* v. *Little*, upon the grave question how to get out of a berth at sea. Mr. Justice Grove appears to think that one must get out anyhow, because he proposed to nonsuit a lady who complained that she was allowed only a chair to step upon. The Master of the Rolls and Mr. Justice Day appear to think that the right way is front foremost, while a learned judge, who is ex-president of the Alpine Club, and who ought to know, declared that he should have hesitated long before deciding whether to get out forwards or backwards when the ship was rolling. The jury were for the lady, who had stepped out forwards on the top rail of a chair which the stewardess had put for her, and had fallen out and hurt herself. The prevalent opinion on the bench shows how civilization has blunted the prehensile faculty in man. We venture to say that there is not an omnibus conductor in London who will not affirm confidently that the right way to come