

Some of these points have already been touched on, and so I shall confine my remarks briefly to such points as have not already been referred to.

(1). With regard to the *distances at which infantry fire may be opened in battle* under normal conditions, the following may be said :

*In the attack*, a premature opening of fire only lengthens out the fight, diminishes the offensive spirit, and may cause an exhaustion of the ammunition when the closer and more important ranges are reached at which the battle is decided. The French defending the village of St. Privat, which formed the French right at the battle of Gravelotte (18th Aug., 1870), had to retire before the German assault for want of ammunition, although they had practically annihilated by infantry fire a previous assault on the same village. Hence the attack should try and get as close to the enemy as possible before opening fire, that is as close as possible without suffering *undue* losses. But even in open country, fire should not be opened in a general manner by the attack until the medium ranges are reached, at all events for troops armed with the Snider rifle and carrying the very limited supplies of ammunition which heavy ammunition entails.

*In the defence*, however, fire may be advantageously opened at the *long* ranges, especially if the conditions for effective long range fire are present. The defenders would, or should, always know the ranges of various prominent objects in front of them and they have, as a rule, good opportunities for observing the effect of the fire.

But in temporising actions or in false attacks, fire may be opened at long ranges: also if there is no artillery or if the artillery arm is weak, infantry may open at longer ranges than usual to prepare the way for its own attack: but in this case a large supply of ammunition should be provided and special troops detailed for the long range firing.

But it must never be forgotten that as a rule too much is expected of infantry fire. Always remember that *at all ranges over the short ranges, efficacy of fire can only be obtained by a relatively long-continued collective fire concentrated on objectives specially selected on account of their offensive or defensive importance at the moment.*

(2, 3). As regards the amount of ammunition to be expended and the number of men to be employed in the firing line to expend it in a reasonable time, we must remember that the moral effect of losses inflicted on an enemy is greater, as these losses are more quickly inflicted. This is one reason for employing as many men as possible. On the other hand we must not have so many men exposed as to cause undue exposure to and losses from the enemy's fire, *until* the effective ranges are reached. When such ranges are reached, we must seek to avoid losses not by mere formations, but by the destruction and demoralisation of the enemy. At this period of the fight, boldness and not caution is real prudence. When long range fire is indulged in, as many men as possible should take part in it to arrive as rapidly as possible at the desired result.

(4). As regards the choice of objectives, it is very necessary to