

or to disarm them, or to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities. UN troops should be and have been authorized to use force.

What can be done in any situation depends on the mandate given to the force. It is always open to the Security Council or the General Assembly in the case may be to enlarge this mandate and authorize the use of the necessary amount of force to achieve specified objectives. This was done during the Congo operation as the developing situation required, and with the aim of preventing civil war clashes and apprehending mercenaries. The mandate thus determines the extent to which any UN peace-keeping force can employ arms in the discharge of responsibilities which have been clearly assigned to it.

In this lecture I have put forward some modest proposals whereby the United Nations could be better prepared for keeping the peace. There are, however, two large and related issues which make such proposals difficult to carry out. The first is financial. The second, and more important, is political.

We know that for the past few years the United Nations has been teetering on the edge of bankruptcy. There have been heavy burdens assumed in the Middle East and the Congo. A number of member states -- including the great powers -- with full capacity to pay have failed to assume their share of these burdens and pay their share of the costs. Others have been slow to pay, even when reductions were granted to take into account their relative incapacity to pay.

This is a deplorable, indeed an intolerable, situation for a world organization established to maintain peace and security. It is especially urgent in view of the growing demands for peace-keeping operations, which have demonstrated not only their worth but their cost. The situation is moving toward a climax this year because a number of states, including the Soviet bloc, now have accumulated arrears of payment which make them subject to Article 19 of the Charter, which provides for the loss of vote in the General Assembly. When it next meets, the Assembly will have to deal with this critical situation, which has far-reaching political and financial implications, unless steps have been taken in the meantime by those in default to liquidate their arrears.

Canada is convinced that the principle of collective responsibility is the only sensible basis for financing peace-keeping operations. We believe that Article 19 was intended to provide, and should provide, the sanction for that principle. We do not seek to force this issue but we are ready to face it if the delinquent states are not prepared to join in a search for a constructive solution. The financial dilemma must be solved.

Even more important is the political conflict which underlies the finance and everything else. This conflict has made it all the more necessary to re-define the political basis for United Nations action in the field of peace preservation. It has also made such re-definition more difficult to bring about. The powers and function of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General have to be clarified in an agreed manner. In particular, the Security Council needs to reassert its authority in a way which will be effective when the peace is threatened.