

The other role of monitors is that of helping to identify and initiate ways of developing a climate of human rights and democracy in partnership with civil society and their legitimate leaders. In the parlance of the UN Human Rights Centre, this constitutes advisory services and technical cooperation.

All the above however is the theory of UN human rights monitors. The practice both past and present is extremely ad hoc, disjointed, and an administrative nightmare.

The present mission had and has some good people in the field, but even their getting there has been fraught with difficulties and delayed to the extreme. For example, the initial plan was to have a team of 6 in the field. The first two arrived only in early June, two months after the massacres began. It was another four weeks before the next 2 arrived with the 5th arriving three weeks later. In September the head monitor quit in reported disgust with the UN system, as did the other 4 soon after¹⁰.

Subsequently under the enhanced plan of action, the Chief of the Field Operation who by all accounts will prove to be a good choice, only arrived in Kigali on September 10th, over 5 months after the present crisis began. This is despite regular warnings prior to April 6th by various UN rapporteurs and a plethora of NGOs that human rights were being seriously violated in Rwanda and that the situation could well get worse. Even allowing for extreme underfunding of the Centre, there are real organizational lacunae if even after such substantive human rights early warnings followed by demonstrable genocide, that the heart of the UN human rights community could not respond more quickly.

The general unpreparedness and organizational weakness of the Centre was then further exacerbated by 'too much, too late'. Encouraged by well meaning NGOs as well as the new government of Rwanda, the High Commissioner who had agreed that his initial 6 monitors would be increased to 20, then agreed to provide a total of 147. He took the last quantum leap despite the increasing number of complaints of administrative, policy, and directional shortcomings.

Asking for \$10,500,000 for a six month field operation, the plan was for it to develop in three phases: Phase I 15 Sep. - 14 Oct. mobile teams out of Kigali; Phase II 15 Oct. - 11 Nov. bases in each Prefecture; and Phase III 14 Nov - 12 Dec bases in Sub-Prefectures. As of the 18 of November, there were only about 40 monitors in the country and they were largely confined to Kigali. The Centre also conceded by early November that they were not going to be able to find and deploy any more than 97 monitors. That the Centre would fail in achieving its goals was not only predictable, but fulfilled the negative perception of most donors who have become increasingly weary of the ways in which the Centre spends their money.

¹⁰ Karen Kinney the team leader as well as the other 4, quit in various degrees of extreme unhappiness at the almost total lack of administrative support and confused operational direction from Geneva. Hopefully the new Chief William Clarence will receive better support so as to concentrate on the task at hand.