

control conventional weapons, and in particular the spread of light weapons, are a fundamental component of the human security agenda of the Government of Canada.

At the regional level, major activities/initiatives in Europe include:

1. the treatment of proliferation issues in the OSCE (FSC) described above;
2. the European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (June 1998).

In addition to these more formal mechanisms, there is an array of informal initiatives linking (more or less) like-minded states, including:

1. the Missile Technology Control regime (MTCR), formed by the G7 in 1987 and increasing in size to 28 states by 1997, restricting transfer of technologies associated with the development of missiles of greater than 500 kg in payload and 300 km in range;
2. the Wassenaar Arrangement, involving 32 major arms exporters in efforts to limit export to countries that (in their judgement) constitute a threat to international peace and security;

Responses to proliferation at the state level are also a critical aspect of ongoing discussion of security in the Euro-Atlantic framework and a major issue for the OSCE. National limitation on exports to particular states are a longstanding element of German, US (and increasingly British) foreign policy. The probable decision by the United States to deploy a limited anti-missile defence system - a response to growing American fears that nuclear and other WMD will end up in the hands of what are deemed to be rogue states - constitutes a major dilemma for security planners in Europe (and Canada). The Russian Federation opposes adjustment of the ABM regime, since it fears that the development of anti-missile capability in the United States will degrade the credibility of its (shrinking) nuclear deterrent. Allies of the United States remain skeptical of the effectiveness of the proposed system and nervous about its effect on nuclear arms control. Covering the United States with such a system while leaving Western Europe out may have a decoupling effect in any collective response to out-of-area threats involving states with incipient nuclear capability.³⁷

IX. The Role of the FSC in European Security

The above discussion begs the question of just what OSCE comparative advantages in the security arena are. Europe is now endowed with an array of much better endowed institutions taking a far more proactive role in the management of security. In some instances, their activities include a substantial normative component, traditionally an area of CSCE/OSCE advantage.

Given the preoccupations of many of these organizations with issues that are also of mandated concern to the FSC, the same question of comparative advantage might be asked about

³⁷ See Ivo H. Daalder and Philip H. Gordon, "Watch for Missile Defence to Become a European Conundrum," *International Herald Tribune* (23 February, 2000), p.8.