

a recognized need for task follow-up - in other words, for a "wagon master".

Of the **communication** type, we found:

- Communication practices during the crisis were predominantly oral due the prompt response expected to a rapidly-changing field situation. This left the *crisis management process* with a thin paper trail, i.e. little written material documenting the management and decision-making processes. Crisis-relevant, written material was mostly issue-specific and/or classified.
- Formal communication activities covered by the Media Relations Office (BCM) included media review, links to domestic and international media, and support for senior management's media exposure. BCM found media coverage of the Canadian-led initiative to be somewhat poor internationally and supportive domestically. Some interviewees disagreed with this assessment and found rather that domestic coverage became increasingly critical while the international media remained supportive throughout.
- Other organizational communication activities were assumed by IDC, to provide an on-site 'central clearing house of information' for all involved to consult and use. According to IDC, the service was well appreciated. Administrative support activities were also supplied through GGD.
- Task force-centred communication within DFAIT, with the Interdepartmental Task Force, Posts, and the international community were rated overall from fair to good, though some weaknesses were evident. An examination of these issues is submitted in section 4.3.3 below.

With regards to **analytic** activities, the following summarizes the roles provided by contributing areas:

- Activities encompassing regional security issues including policy matters, networking with international counterparts, operational and tactical details such as MOUs, SOFAs, flight clearances, and