

Several participants raised a fundamental issue: What was the international community — and, for that matter, key individual actors such as South Korea and the United States — prepared to give up in order to stop the North Korean nuclear programme? What were the "buy-out" options? Who would pay? Was the North Korean government even interested in trading its programme for anything else when it saw its very survival linked so closely to that programme? These were very difficult questions with answers that seemed discouraging.

Returning to the point made earlier about the role of the United States in providing some key technical information on compliance, several participants suggested that this reliance by arms control regimes on data from national technical means (NTM) sources would be a continuing trend in the future. The information provided by the United States, as well as other states with competent NTM resources, would be vital for virtually any new arms control or security management regime. Although new arms control or security organizations could incorporate independent monitoring means, this would be an extremely costly measure and one unlikely to be welcomed by cost-conscious participants. As long as appropriate procedures were developed for the use of outside monitoring data, few participants saw any fundamental problem with this approach. It certainly offered the prospect of enhancing the capabilities of virtually any arms control regime, but only if the participants felt that the information was developed on a non-discriminatory basis.

The general conclusion in this discussion was that we must assume that North Korea now had nuclear weapons. Although it was agreed that the Kim regime might not yet possess actual, functioning weapons, it was safest to assume that it had at least a handful of working systems, however crude. This fundamental assumption structured all policy options in the opinion of the participants. The safest and wisest course was to both appease the Kim regime and, as far as it was possible, ignore its nuclear status, thereby minimizing the diplomatic benefits of having gone nuclear. This course of gentle isolation ought to be pursued, it was thought, against a background of strong conventional defence preparedness in South Korea. At the same time, all reasonable efforts ought to be undertaken to open new or maintain existing channels of negotiation and contact with the North. It seemed quite clear that sanctions would not work and easily could become counter-productive. There was also a consensus that modest economic cooperation and assistance would, on balance, be wise, as it would help sustain the Kim regime until its demise. Chaos in the North was not a preferred option and would only make the eventual reconciliation of the two Koreas more difficult.

The second morning paper was presented by Mr. Ron Deibert. "ISMA Reappraised: The Politics of Multilateral Satellite Reconnaissance" fit in well with the earlier discussion of NTM and monitoring resources for arms control regimes. Mr. Deibert's presentation focused on the feasibility of developing a multilateral reconnaissance satellite image distribution centre operating out of the