

PREFACE

The Gulf War brought to the surface the serious concerns about the potential for developing, producing and stockpiling biological and toxin weapons. In regard to Iraq, this matter has been the subject of investigation under United Nations Security Council Resolution 687. But concern about such matters neither began, nor ended, with the Gulf War. For example, prior to that conflict, the Iraq-Iran war also prompted various media speculation about what might have been going on behind closed laboratory doors in each of the countries.

An uncertain political and security environment can become fertile ground for such speculation. Even legitimate programs, in such a climate, can fuel concerns and lead to responses in of terms secrecy or actions that, in turn, become further destabilizing. This was clearly recognized at the Third Review Conference of State Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), held in September 1991, when a refined and expanded set of confidence-building measures (CBMs) was agreed by the Parties to the Convention. Designed to enhance transparency, these CBMs not only implicitly recognize the dual-use nature of various technologies and activities, but also explicitly recognize the value to be gained at the international level through the exchange of information.

It must be absolutely clear from the outset that this paper does not address the question of biological and toxin warfare. It is about technology, research and the free flow of information. Iran has been chosen as a case study because it has been the subject of media speculation, undoubtedly much to its chagrin. Clearly, the sooner one might be able to set such speculation to rest, the better off we all will be. This paper examines the utility of "collateral analysis" as a tool to help clarify such situations and to enhance transparency.