

The old security treaty placed emphasis on the United States right to deploy forces in Japan. In the late 1950s, Japan proposed revisions with a view to matching treaty provisions to current circumstances which led, in January 1960, to the Japan-United States Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. This new treaty came into force in June 1960 and, although revised, remains the legal basis and framework for bilateral defence cooperation.

A significant element of the new treaty is Article Five which states that, while the United States is to provide assistance to Japan in times of threats to national security, there is no reciprocal obligation on the part of Japan to come to the aid of United States forces in Japan (USFJ), or to respond in any way to an attack on United States territory. The treaty is not one of collective defence, but of cooperation for the protection and security of Japan.<sup>5</sup>

American withdrawal from Viet Nam, the evolution of "detente", and the Nixon Doctrine of the early 1970s led many observers in Japan to comment on what was then perceived as a "strategy gap" between the two countries - with Japan emphasizing the political and economic aspects of East-West relations while the United States stressed the need for its allies to enhance military preparedness. There was also a lack of clear understanding of the bilateral security treaty by both the American and Japanese publics: many in the United States argued that Japan received security benefits while giving little in return; many Japanese viewed USFJ as a means to bolster American regional interests and only by extension contributing to Japanese national defence.<sup>6</sup>

### **The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier:**

In the early 1980s, officials in the Reagan Administration began to criticize Japan not only for its failure to shoulder a fair share of the defence burden but for Japan's seeming unwillingness to adhere to a hard-line (or realistic) approach to Soviet military adventurism and expansionism. American doubts were somewhat placated by Prime Minister Nakasone who, when visiting the United States in 1981, announced that Japan would serve as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" in cooperation with Washington to ensure regional stability.

The 1983 Williamsburg Declaration on Security<sup>7</sup> allied Japan even more closely with the security policies of the United States and NATO. The Williamsburg Declaration caused Nakasone and the ruling LDP great difficulty in the Diet. Opposition critics complained that Nakasone had committed Japan to further involvement in America's renewed global containment strategy and to a greater Japanese military role in Asia Pacific. However unpopular at home, Nakasone's comments were welcomed by Reagan Administration officials and convinced many in the United States that Japan was committed to developing the military capability necessary to defend itself against the Soviet threat.<sup>8</sup>