

wrong, is something we must refuse to believe until established by better evidence than the partial and fragmentary observations hitherto recorded. To evolve, or educate, a conscience in such a tribe, did it exist, by any process of civilization, would be as impossible as to convey to a man blind from birth a conception of colors.

Mr. Herbert Spencer's main assault is, however, directed against the following proposition, with which Kant opens his treatise on Ethics:—"Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a 'Good Will.'" This proposition Kant goes on to define as follows:

"A good will is good, not because of what it performs, or effects, nor by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition, that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed higher than all that can be brought about by it in favor of any inclination, nay even of the sum total of all inclinations."

In reference to these propositions and the reasonings by which Kant supports them, Mr. Herbert Spencer observes that they are an inversion of the *a priori* method. All normal exact reasoning sets out with propositions of which the negations are inconceivable, and advances by successive dependent propositions each of which has the like character—that its negation is inconceivable. In the case in question, he avers, Kant proceeds in the inverted *a priori* method. That is to say, instead of setting out with a proposition of which the negation is inconceivable, he sets out with a proposition of which the affirmation is inconceivable, and then builds upon this a series of conclusions, the steps of which are in themselves valid.

How then does Spencer proceed to show that Kant's major premise above quoted is an inconceivable proposition? He first proposes to interpret definitely the meaning of the words "a Good Will." "Will implies the consciousness of some end to be achieved. Exclude from it every idea of purpose, and the conception of Will disappears. An end of some kind being necessarily implied by the conception of Will, the quality of the Will is determined by the quality of the end contemplated. Will