gone so far as to charge a grand jury, that the committal of a man for perjury at previous assizes was an entire mistake, as it contravened the fundamental principle that, when a question has been once decided in a court of justice, it can never be raised again between the same parties in any proceedings. The principle referred to, however, seems to be wholly out of place in this connection. So far as regards civil proceedings, it was settled long ago that a man may be perjured by an oath taken in his own cause as well as by an oath taken where he is a witness for another, (Russell on Crimes, 6th ed., p. 320), and it is difficult to see any good reason why the same rule should not prevail in criminal proceedings. Indeed this view of the learned judge is quite opposed to the few authorities on the subject that have come under our notice. In New South Wales a defendant has been successfully prosecuted for perjury in evidence given in his own behalf (*Reg.* v. *Dean*, 17 N.S.W. 357). Similarly in an unreported case tried some three or four years ago before Justice Vaughan Williams, the prisoner was sentenced for perjury in his own behalf, the learned judge saying that it was all important that prisoners should know that they could not commit perjury with impunity. And now within the last few months another English case is reported in which a man was convicted of perjury in evidence by which he sought to establish an alibi in a prosecution before the magistrates for trespassing in pursuit of game.

The technical propriety of such prosecutions may, therefore, be taken for granted. But there is certainly room for a wide divergence of view as to the extent to which it is advisable to direct such prosecutions, due regard being had to the supposed policy which prompted the enactment of the statute. An illustration of the extreme form of one theory upon the point is furnished by the truly preposterous conduct of Justice Ridley on a recent occasion which has been commented upon elsewhere. It is, of course, perfectly evident that, if judges are to make a common practice of terrorizing prisoners in this manner, the new law will tend more and more to become a dead letter. As Mr. Justice Mathews has justly and pertinently remarked, in comparing the situation to that which was created by the earlier statute allowing litigants to give evidence in civil proceedings, "no man would go into the box if he had the fear hanging over him that, whether he was believed or disbelieved, a prosecution for perjury would