ernment. 'I certainly think it is harder to get at the truth in an English County Court,' he declares, 'than it was in a North-West cutchery.' And he adds, 'I took a note of a hundred consecutive cases for less than £20 tried before me at Birmingham. I found there was hard cross-swearing in sixty-three. Of course there is much hard swearing which is not perjury,' but 'after making all allowance for hard swearing which is not perjury, there remains a terrible residuum of wilful and corrupt perjury, which urgently calls for a remedy if the administration of justice is not to be reduced to a farce.' The expression here employed is by no means adequate. If the orders of a Court are so infected by false testimony as to be as often wrong as right, or to anything like that extent, the administration of justice is not a 'farce,' but an outrage, and the sooner the Courts are shut up the better. Bad as matters are, however, they have not reached so terrible a pitch as that. No one doubts that the truth is very generally arrived at in the result, and, although we should agree with Judge Chalmers that the administration of the oath is nowadays very often an 'irreverent farce,' we see no ground for thinking that it is more difficult than at any former period to determine issues of fact. With the proposal that the judge should deal with perjury committed before him as a contempt of Court, Judge Chalmers will have nothing to do; and in this he shows the sound sense which characterises the whole of his article. Apart from the great and necessary safeguard which the concurrence of two independent tribunals constitutes, the judge who tries the cause in which the perjury is committed is not, at the moment, a fair judge of the offence. 'There is a good deal of human nature in most judges, and a judge is naturally annoyed when he discovers an attempt to deceive him and to make him do injustice in a case he is trying.' Besides, the liberty of men and women is not to be disposed of in the mood or the hurry which a press of business introduces, at least in County Courts, into the determination of small debt cases. 'We have no time to do things regularly,' a very capable London County Court judge recently said, in answer to a remonstrance from the Bar. This is perfectly true, and it constitutes a final objection to the exercise of criminal and civil jurisdictions concurrently and contemporaneously. If the procedure for the prosecution of petty perjury were made simple, easy, and expeditious in the way the article proposes, it would be necessary to provide a safeguard