

the doctrine of the creation of animals; but to what is it that creation refers?—not to genera and higher groups, they express only the relations of things created,—not to individuals as now existing, they are the results of the laws of invariability and increase of the species,—but to certain original individuals, protoplasts, formed after their kinds or species, and representing the powers and limits of variation inherent in the species—the potentialities of their existence, as Dana well expresses it. The species, therefore, with all its powers and capacities for reproduction, is that which the Creator has made, his unit in the work, as well as ours in the study. The individuals are merely so many masses of organised matter, in which, for the time, the powers of the species are embodied; and the only animal having a true individuality is man, who enjoys this by virtue of mental endowments, over-ruling the instincts which in other animals narrowly limit the action of the individual. To this great difference between the limitations imposed on animals by a narrow range of specific powers, and the capacity for individual action which in man forces even his physical organisation, in itself more plastic than that of most other animals, to bend to his dominant will, we trace not only the varieties of the human species, but the changes which man effects upon those lower animals which in instincts and constitution are sufficiently ductile for domestication.

Thirdly, the species is different, not in degree, but in kind, from the genus, the order, and the class. We may recognise a generic resemblance in a series of line engravings representing different subjects, but we recognise a specific unity only in those struck from the same plate; and no one can convince us that the resemblance of a series of coins, medals, or prints, from different dies or plates, is at all of the same kind with that which subsists between those produced from the same die or plate. In like manner, the relation between the members of the brood of the song sparrow of this spring, is of a different kind as well as different degree from that between the song sparrow and any other species of sparrow. So of the brood of last year to which the parent sparrows may have belonged; so by parity of reasoning of all former broods, and all song sparrows everywhere. The species differs from all other groups in not being an ideal entity, but consisting of individuals struck from the same die, produced by continuous reproduction from the same creative source. Nor need we suppose, with our author—for as yet it is merely an hypothesis—that spe-