

POSITION OF OUTPOSTS.

The position of the outposts depends upon the character of the country and the habits of the enemy.

If it is necessary that the most advanced body should be a considerable distance from the army itself, they must consist of three lines, viz. :

The *outlying picquets* and their sentries.

The *supports* and their sentries, and the *reserves*.

Generally speaking, two lines are sufficient, that is, *outlying picquets* and their supports.

The distance between these lines depends also upon the character of the country, and that of the enemy.

The advance sentries may be four hundred yards or a quarter of a mile from their picquets; the picquets double that distance from their supports.

The general direction of the beat of the picquets of the first line is *parallel to the front* of the army, to *intercept passage to the rear*.

The general direction of the beat of the sentries of the supports and reserves, is *perpendicular to the front*, their duty being mainly to *connect* the picquets with the supports and the supports with the reserves or main body.

STRENGTH OF OUTPOSTS.

The numerical strength of the outposts will depend upon the character of the country, open or close, the extent of front of the army they cover, the character of the enemy and the average length of the beat of a sentry.

The strength of the army is a measure of the *space to be occupied* by its front, and that length *divided by the average length of a sentry's beat gives the number of posts required*.

The *length of the sentries' beat* should be the maximum that the closeness or openness of the country allows of; the sentries being able to see each other.

The greater the length of the sentries beat the fewer the number of posts and picquets to supply them, their number should be the minimum.

1st. Because an enemy can *always force outposts* if he determines to do so, it is useless therefore to have a greater number of outposts than that necessary to sufficiently delay him, and give the main body *time to get under arms*.

2nd. Outpost duty is of all duties the most wearying.

3rd. Noise and confusion of numerous outposts being driven in (at night especially) causes panic.

Single sentries retiring on their picquets, and picquets being driven in on their supports, should endeavor to avoid *retiring directly in the line of fire* of the supports and reserves.

The lines of retirement should be indicated to all parties in the daytime. Indeed, no one who has not had practical experience of the fact, can realize the extreme difficulty of moving even small detachments of troops by night.

sun being south at noon, East at 6 a. m., S. E. at 9 a. m., S. W. at 3 p. m. Of course if a man faces N. E., is right—W. left—South to the rear. Churches are almost always built E. and W. i. e., altar to the East steeple to the West. An officer can get a reliable compass no larger than a 25 cents piece, to carry on his watch chain, officers should not be ordered to hide watch chains, but shown them with the compass attached. In reporting, the right bank is the right hand looking down stream.

Every advantage should be taken therefore, which may offer itself to reconnoiter favorable situations for the outposts in daytime, and the officers and men should familiarize themselves with the character of the country and its general features. The commander should point out to the men the direction from which the reliefs and patrols, will come and the position of each sentry, and the line of retirement on the supports, the direction the enemy may be expected,—pointing rods, placed by day are a safe means of keeping attention to certain points at night.

APPROXIMATION IN FIGURES, TO COVER A MILE OF COUNTRY WITH OUTPOSTS.

Take 1600 yards or say a mile, as the length of the front of a Division (that is 2 Brigades,) 10,000 men or thereabouts, 32 posts will be required. Taking the average length of a sentries beat to be 50 yards in an ordinary open country, you have 1600 divided by 50 equals 32.

Suppose the sentries for these 32 posts to be furnished by six picquets, furnishing six posts each, the four central picquets, the two flank pickets, five posts each.

The sentries are generally double, and the duty two hours on and two hours off, i. e., six men for each post for 24 hours. A Canadian company of 42 men should, therefore, furnish for one picquets five or six posts with double sentries—30 or 36 men with the necessary officers and non-commissioned officers.


The officers and non-commissioned officers being visiting patrols not only at reliefs but in the intervals. Six Canadian companies therefore at intervals of 250 or 300 yards would furnish efficient picquets, The supports would be formed by the other four companies of a battalion.

One Canadian ten company battalion, therefore would suffice for the outposts of 10,000 men under ordinary circumstances, but if there are no reserve, portions of the main body would be told off as inlying picquets to sleep with their accoutrements on.

The Burst Guns.

The recognised method of combating a public evil is to educate the public; in the same manner, should what we conceive to be an evil appear to be creeping into Her Majesty's Service, our duty is clearly to educate, educate, educate, and thus, if possible, make it plain to even the reading cadet at Woolwich, and the studious lieutenant in the Navy, that such guns as we illustrate elsewhere are not trustworthy, that their construction is at variance with first principles, and that our arguments have been proved to be correct by notorious explosions; fortunately, as yet, not in our ships, as these guns, though ordered, have not yet been placed on board.

With regard to the guns we illustrate, it should be remembered that in both instances the trunnions remained in their places. The front portion of the *Duilio's* gun remained in its place, the muzzle resting on the ship's deck, while the breech portion, as shown in the drawing, was blown against the turret wall, smashing it, and opening the huge plates like doors on outside, all the men in the turret being more or less burnt by the escaping powder flames. In the case of the *Angamos' gun*, the trunnions only remained, the rest of the gun having been blown overboard to starboard and to port, killing a lieutenant and the captain of the gun and—let it be carefully noted—scorching the gun's crew in the same manner as on board the *Duilio*. Now what is the cause of these disasters, especially when it is



Soldiers should be taught to recognize the stars which from the constellation of the Great Bear, whose two forelegs or pointers are in a straight line with the north star. The points of the compass can be found in the day time by a watch, the