

solidarity". The Yugoslavs are Communists and, therefore, do agree with many positions taken by the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, they fear that the Soviet Union might use this feeling as an entry point in order to infringe ultimately upon Yugoslav independence and exert influence over its decision-making as the price for the Yugoslav desire for "socialist solidarity".

#### Basic tension

Thus there exists a basic tension in Yugoslavia's foreign policy. On the one hand, the Yugoslavs desire to a certain extent to placate the Soviet Union, which poses a potentially dangerous and imperialist threat to Yugoslavia (but also shares with Yugoslavia certain common principles and visions of a socialist world). This is coupled with Yugoslavia's particular influence, by the example of its success as a Communist country outside the Soviet bloc, on other Communist parties and states. The Yugoslav example could be viewed by some impressionable Communist parties as an encouragement to defy certain Soviet strictures on foreign and/or domestic policy.

On the other hand, the successful use of the nonalignment policy to manipulate both super-powers has increased Yugoslavia's power and influence in world affairs far beyond what its size, location and level of development would ordinarily have indicated. The Yugoslavs have not forgotten that they survived the 1948 clash with the Kremlin mainly through massive co-ordinated trade and economic, and even military, aid from the West. No demands that would have compromised Yugoslav independence accompanied Western assistance. As a result, the Yugoslavs have maintained their ties to the West more or less closely depending on the intimacy of their relations with the Soviet Union at any given time. Memories of 1948 have insured that Yugoslavia has regarded the U.S.S.R. with at least a touch of caution no matter how friendly relations between the two countries have become.

Yugoslavia tends to react more harshly to potential Soviet threats than to possible Western threats. For example, the Yugoslavs roundly condemned the December 1975 statement of Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counsellor of the U.S. State Department. Sonnenfeldt had suggested that Yugoslavia should become less dependent upon the United States and should rely more on its own strength in its relations with the Soviet Union. He commented further that world tension

might decline if there were a "organic" relation between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Such remarks implied that the Yugoslavs might always be able to count entirely on an American counterbalance to possible Soviet imperialism as they had since 1945. Until Sonnenfeldt's statement, American foreign policy had seemed to assume the need to forestall Soviet attempts to extend hegemony over Yugoslavia. Such an American stand had allowed Yugoslavia to follow a foreign policy based on extracting concessions from both super-powers by balancing the interests of one against those of the other. The Sonnenfeldt statement implied, however, that this freedom of manoeuvre might not in the future be in the American national interest. The Yugoslavs responded to the Sonnenfeldt remarks with loud and widespread criticism.

On the other hand, the remarks of Secretary-General Leonid Brezhnev after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 generated more than verbal condemnations. Brezhnev justified this intervention in Czechoslovakia in a statement, known in the West as the "Brezhnev Doctrine", of the limited sovereignty of socialist countries. The "Doctrine" cited the defence of the socialist achievements that were being threatened by imminent counterrevolution of the Czechoslovak "reformers" as the reason for the invasion. The implication of this rationale was that the Soviet Union alone decided when the interests of the "socialist commonwealth" took precedence over international law. The Yugoslavs responded by developing a new defence system to guard against the prospect of a Czechoslovak-type intervention in Yugoslavia. It is clear, furthermore, that Stane Dolanc, Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Presidency of the League of Communists' Central Committee, was looking eastward when he warned in 1976:

... this country wishes to make it quite clear that it will not tolerate threats to its independent, sovereign and non-aligned position from anyone or from any quarter. To be sure, there are no overt threats of this kind being made today; nevertheless, there have been instances of mischief-making from time to time and various malicious conjectures are often heard about what will become of Yugoslavia tomorrow. Let it be well understood that the future of Yugoslavia lies in the further development of the socialist system of self-management and the policy of nonalignment, and let there be no illusions that it might be elsewhere.

*Successful use of non-alignment to manipulate superpowers has increased influence*