

nation to join together in self-defence and an adequate measure of political stability. To the extent that these factors have been lacking, for a variety of reasons, in the areas of South-East Asia and the Middle East, progress towards regional organizations, despite the existence of a Communist threat, has been slow. However, the South-East Asian Defence Pact and the new Turkish-Iraqi Treaty, which the United Kingdom and the United States are expected to join, may provide the framework for the build-up of regional defence to counter the Communist threat in South-East Asia and the Middle East respectively. The contributions of countries from outside the region threatened most of necessity be limited, for if the military resources of the free world are scattered all over the place, they risk being too thinly scattered and ineffectively applied in any given place. The mobile sea and air forces of the United States, and to a lesser extent those of the United Kingdom, are notable exceptions.

47. With considerations such as these in mind, it is in Canada's interest to see that effective regional defence organizations are built up, but not necessarily with Canada's direct participation. Canada's own security interests lie primarily in North America and the North Atlantic Treaty area, where its commitments are already heavy. Canada's interests would not be involved directly in the holding of any particular area around the Soviet periphery in the Far East or the Middle East, except in so far as Canada may share with other members of the free world the general interest of resisting Communist expansion. But even though Canada may not be directly involved in such peripheral and local wars, she cannot escape certain consequences if the United States were involved, especially because of the interdependence of the two countries in air defence. Such local and limited wars are, therefore, of concern to Canada. Canada, naturally, has an interest in upholding the universal principle of resistance to the use of force and the other objectives of the United Nations. It is reasonable to deduce, therefore, that Canada would not participate in local or limited wars, unless by a decision of the United Nations which it had accepted.

The Cold War

48. It is a truism to say that the Communist threat by no means poses a straight military problem. A characteristic of Communist strategy has been its opportunism. The Communists have employed a variety of ways of extending their control, adapting their methods according to the resources, psychological as well as material, available to them in any particular area. In places where political instability and economic discontent provide opportunities for seizing the control of governments by subversion, political rather than military methods have been employed. Assuming that current efforts to improve East-West relations do not bring about a change in the basic Communist aims of extending their control over the rest of the world, the cold war may be expected to go on.

49. Communist strategy in the cold war has already had a large measure of success. The Soviet orbit has been growing apace, (particularly by the inclusion of China) without general war and without the Soviet Union being itself openly involved in hostilities. The free world as a result of gradual Communist peripheral advances may be confronted with the peril of about eight hundred million Communists now within the Soviet orbit consolidating the Eurasian land mass into one economic and politico-military power system. It cannot be assumed that this bloc is solid yet. Indeed it is to be hoped that Russian and Chinese policies and interests may diverge, and it is obviously in the interests of Canada and its allies to encourage any such fissile tendencies. The consolidation of this bloc under monolithic control would represent a concentration of power — political, military and economic — that would obviously affect the world balance of power.