

*Supply—External Affairs*

of territory from the political entity which is its rightful state. The worst thing we can do is to try to reduce this complexity to an emotional catch phrase such as to rescue the west Berliners from Russian tyranny or, on the other hand, guard the socialist people's state from western imperialism. The worst thing also that we can do is to inject into this political situation the heart-rending problems of the east German refugees. I know all of us are concerned; indeed perhaps some of us are even heartbroken about the situation of these people. However, we have no right to expect that West Berlin can be continued as a means of subverting the east German government. If it becomes a matter of helping to oppress people by our foreign policy we are going to be in serious difficulties indeed, as this will mean real war.

We have much to answer for in Angola, in South Africa and French North Africa. The only way we can help these people on the other side of the iron curtain is by a long and continuous process of working toward peace and convincing the U.S.S.R. that the heavy hand is less and less necessary. That alone is the final answer.

Therefore Canada's role must be to bring the powers together. We must negotiate and it must be done quickly. I think the Secretary of State for External Affairs was very wise when he said that one of the things that has certainly confused the problem in West Berlin is the fact that an election is going on and you have each of the politicians of West Berlin and west Germany seeking to sell their electorate a bill of goods that they indeed are going to protect Germany's interests and unite their peoples. Even Mr. Khrushchev suggested that things will be much better after September 17, as our own Secretary of State for External Affairs suggested. But we must bring them together to negotiate before the area of negotiation disappears. We must bring both sides closer and closer together. The area of negotiation is becoming less and less. The national pride of each one is being bound up within certain terms and certain items of any negotiated peace treaty and it may come to the point where every concession becomes appeasement, where every agreement becomes seeming treachery. Again, we must bring the powers together to negotiate. We must do so because this period of crisis and tension puts power into the hands of the very group we should fear most.

We tend to think of Russia as a monolithic state very much like Nazi Germany. The two do not compare. Mr. Khrushchev is not Hitler. He does not have the power. The Russian people are not the German people

[Mr. Pitman.]

with the historical background of the German people nor are the doctrines of communism those of nazism. They bear little relationship when you come down to actual analysis. There is cut and thrust to their politics and a constant striving for power. We encourage the military elite of Russia to ascendancy, when we pose as intransigent.

I think perhaps the greatest disaster of the U-2 incident was that we placed the men we should fear most in control of the Russian state. We must come down to essentials.

What has Mr. Khrushchev actually said; what has he promised? It is very easy to say we cannot trust what Mr. Khrushchev says. But if we come to that point, really what we are saying is that there is no answer but pushing the button. Mr. Khrushchev, in his answer to President Kennedy's speech, said:

Following from the international law which cannot be disregarded, I should like to repeat once more that by concluding a peace treaty with the German democratic republic we do not intend to infringe upon any lawful interests of the western powers. Barring of access to West Berlin, blockade of West Berlin, is entirely out of the question.

That is the statement of Mr. Khrushchev himself. Are we going to war because we will not recognize a state which exists? Mr. Trygve Lie, the former secretary general of the United Nations, suggested once that the Korean war was brought on by our refusal to recognize red China. Are we going to war to perpetuate a myth that we are determined to create a united Germany? Are we going to war to bolster the national pride of either the United States, which is coming out of the fiasco of Cuba, or because of the injured pride of the U.S.S.R. which is somewhat reluctant to accept the fact that refugees are leaving the socialist heaven of East Germany? Are we going to war to maintain a status quo which we ourselves do not accept, in terms of West Berlin and a recognition of East Germany? I think these are the essentials which we as Canadians must bring before the nations of the world by negotiation.

As I drove down here this morning I was impressed, as was the hon. member for York South, by the very fact that in spite of all the technological advances and the magic which we can now perform with the human mind we cannot seem to solve these human relationships. I could not help feeling, perhaps emotionally, as I drove past groups of children who stood on the side of the highway waiting for the school bus to come, what a tragedy it was that we as members of parliament were driving down here to discuss war and the possibility of war.

Once again we must negotiate. We must find the area of fear, of blind, unreasoning