

diplomacy fails. This once hallowed dogma has ceased to have validity today for two principal reasons:

In the first place, major military power is no longer held physically in rear areas to be sent out only when peaceful negotiation fails. Today's system of alliances and their integrated commands together with long-range striking power at constant alert have brought military forces to forward positions on the main fronts of international tension. In the new circumstances of more or less permanent confrontation of major military power, the extent to which co-ordination of foreign and defence policy becomes imperative is obvious.

Secondly, it is no longer possible to rationalize major war as an instrument for the attainment of political ends...for the traditional concepts of victor and vanquished have been overtaken by technological advances in the art of war. In an age when the principal military powers each possess many times over the destructive power of all the weapons used in all previous wars, and have the means to deliver it so dispersed and so well protected that neither could escape unacceptable damage in a thermonuclear exchange, no matter who should initiate it, the principal purpose of the armed forces of all responsible powers has become one of deterring rather than winning major wars, and of containing small ones by the graduated application of the minimum force needed to restore order. The important developments in recent days which have been taking place in Moscow are evidence that the major nuclear powers at least are beginning to accept the essentials of deterrence as I have described it. By the same token the aims of defence policy become the more clearly identical with the main purpose of foreign policy -- the preservation of peace.

There are of course other objectives of foreign policy -- to promote trade, to protect national interests abroad, to project a favourable image abroad and the like -- but it is self-evident that such objectives can be pursued only in a world free of war.

We saw in the Second World War how all other interests had to be set aside and subordinated to the one end -- the restoration of peace. But think how much more imperative is the need to preserve that peace in an era when meaningful victory would elude even the strongest powers. My colleague the Minister of National Defence in his statement on June 27 stated that defence policy was an extension of foreign policy, and that is true in the sense that national external objectives no longer can be determined, as they were in earlier periods of history, by the degree of military force that could be brought to bear. I prefer, however, to look upon foreign and defence policies -- and indeed, foreign economic policy as well -- all as inseparable elements in the conduct of Canada's external relations. Indeed, NATO itself offers a striking example of the extent to which the foreign and defence policies of the entire Western world are indissolubly linked, for it is in the NATO Council in permanent session (and from time to time in ministerial session) that the defence policies which guide the vast apparatus of the alliance are continuously harmonized with the foreign policy objectives of the alliance itself.