

has been to increase mutual understanding and the continuing (and expanding) process of interaction and exchanges enhances this prospect.

However, notwithstanding the progress and the encouraging developments, significant differences remain due to different historical, cultural, and geostrategic perspectives. For instance, even though China's participation in various Track I and Track II multilateral security forums has been on the rise, a fundamental change of perspectives on China's part in seeing multilateralism as the norm of conducting interstate relations remains cosmetic rather than substantive. On key regional issues, such as the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Beijing and Ottawa remain apart regarding the mechanisms for and routes to resolution. There has yet to be a big step forward beyond the endorsement of multilateralism in general terms (which both countries find no particular difficulty in so doing) to the institutionalization of multilateralism as a norm in dealing with specific regional security issues, where Beijing and Ottawa still see differently. This resistance to fundamental change can be traced to the resilience of the Chinese strategic culture and its influences over Beijing's security perceptions and policy making.⁵⁷ Indeed, there may be a number of reasons that would account for the absence of a "leap forward" from Beijing. These are the regional characteristics, and China's past experience and the dynamics of domestic politics. Unlike the case in Europe, where multilateral institutions such as NATO and WTO dominated the security architecture during the Cold War, in Asia Pacific, approaches to security had been either unilateral (self-reliance) or bilateral; indeed, most defense arrangements have involved the US at one end and one of the Asia-Pacific countries at the other. The few exceptions to this general rule, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), or the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), have not played a predominant role in regional security.⁵⁸ This probably explains the initial US response, which was lukewarm at best, to initiatives aimed at setting up a multilateral, region-wide security framework.⁵⁹

Another point that should be kept in mind is that not until the early 1990s have there emerged numerous proposals for the regional multilateral security frameworks and only since then has there been a general trend toward discussing new mechanisms for regional cooperation on security matters. Today, there are a multitude of security dialogues at various levels, or what may be called "multiplex", "multi-layered", or "multifaceted" structure.⁶⁰ Some of the principles of cooperative security have only recently taken roots: assurance rather than deterrence; multilateral process to replace or at least coexist with bilateral military alliance; and promotion of both military and non-military security. If progress in Asia-Pacific multilateralism must be judged against its own past, considering,

⁵⁷ See, for example, Jing-dong Yuan, "Culture Matters: Chinese Approaches to Arms Control and Disarmament," *Contemporary Security Policy* 19:1 (April 1998), pp.85-128.

⁵⁸ William T. Tow, "Contending Security Approaches in the Asia-Pacific Region," *Security Studies* 3:1 (Autumn 1993), pp.75-116.

⁵⁹ James A. Baker, III, "America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community," *Foreign Affairs* 70:5 (Winter 1991/92), pp.1-18.

⁶⁰ Paul M. Evans, "Building Security: The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)," *The Pacific Review* 7:2 (1994), pp.125-139.