

### **19 June**

SG report to SC in which he set out the response to efforts to raise troops/equipment for an expanded UNAMIR. Ethiopia, Ghana, Senegal, Zambia and Zimbabwe offered a battalion, while the Congo, Malawi, Mali, and Nigeria offered a company. All troops offers were on the condition that they be fully equipped. Italy and Netherlands offered one aircraft on condition they did not fly into Rwandan air space, the UK offered 50 trucks (reimbursable), and the US 50 APCs(reimbursable). France unilaterally offered to pay for Senegalese troop equipment. Other unofficial offers waiting firm commitments: Australia (medical coy), Canada (comms coy), Italy (20 tanker trucks), Romania (surgical team), Russia (8 helicopters and transport planes).

SG thus envisaged deployment of Phase I UNAMIR by first week of July, but Phase II seriously under-committed and it could take 3 months despite continued killings of civilians. He suggested the SC consider the French initiative which would operate until UNAMIR was strong enough to take over.

### **20 June**

Signals that the US was prepared to back the French initiative, and might even supply transport. Also, Senegal and Zaire have agreed to participate.

### **21 June**

Canada agrees to provide up to 350 comms personnel.

France and SG actively lobbying for support for the French initiative. The OAU SG Salim Salim opposed as he viewed long term solution based upon Arusha Accords which involved France leaving Rwanda. RPF representatives openly opposed and implying that UNAMIR would be in jeopardy as a result. New Zealand left SC meeting to disassociate itself from initiative. China and Nigeria wanted clarification of RPF position before agreeing. Ghana as the largest troop contributor was incensed they had not been consulted by SG. Pakistan ambivalent as SG representative to Rwanda had personal doubts but carried the SG's line. Russia supportive but in the context that they were about to send 3000 troops into Georgia and wished to get the same type of resolution passed to legitimize their actions. The French went away to redraft resolution with a view to resubmitting it to SC next day.

### **22 June**

SC Res 929/94 10-0-5 (abst: China, Brazil, Nigeria, Pakistan, New Zealand) authorizing the French led operation Turquoise to create humanitarian safe zones in west and south west Rwanda. The resolution is hedged with a variety of claw back phrases: "strictly humanitarian...not constitute an inter-position force...unique case...a threat to peace and security in the region...until UNAMIR is brought up to the necessary strength...two months".

In the SC debate, it received extremely qualified support and only passed because of extensive and effective lobbying by France as a permanent member abetted by the SG despite advice from his staff. The US gave support along with cautions about need for transparency and need to get UNAMIR up to strength. The US announced it had agreed to equip the Ghanaian battalion, and that they would pressure the RPF to avoid contact with French Operation Turquoise

### **28 June**

Troops Contributors meeting faced with no new offers, and USG Annan felt many of the equipment requests were unreasonable. Present UNAMIR strength primarily 1/2 Ghanaian Bn of 314 and Tunisian Coy of 40. It was hoped by the end of July the rest of the Ghanaian Bn along with Zimbabwean and Ethiopian Bn and Canadian Squadron for a total of 2810. USG Annan pointedly asked all countries present who had not made commitments to comment, and clearly indicated his frustration with their smoke and mirrors.

UNCHR Special Rapporteur René Degni Ségui submitted his Report on the human rights situation in Rwanda E/CN.4/1995/7 28 June 1994