

inspections to confirm elimination of support facilities (other than production facilities) and operating bases verify that this process has been carried out.

Short-notice inspections are a breakthrough; for the first time the superpowers have implemented an agreement which gives them the right to request short-notice inspections of designated sites. This enables the parties to check any suspicious findings. Or one side may simply wish to confirm quickly any reported data so that the other side does not have time to change sites before the inspectors arrive.

The inspecting state must give sixteen hours notice of arrival at a point of entry, and then four to twenty-four hours notice of the site to be inspected. Missile operating bases and support facilities designated in the Treaty, other than elimination facilities and production facilities, are subject to this type of inspection. Twenty of these inspections are permitted each year for the first three years, with the quota declining to fifteen for the next five years, and ten over the last five years.

The Treaty specifies that each party shall construct a permanent portal monitoring system around the perimeter of one designated production facility in the other country. This form of inspection was included to deal with the problem of the similarity between the SS-20, an intermediate-range missile, and the SS-25, a long-range missile not covered by the Treaty.

In the Soviet Union, the US has established a monitoring team at a former SS-20 facility at Votkinsk which continues to produce stages of the SS-25 missile. In the US, the Soviet Union monitors a plant in Magna, Utah, which previously produced parts for the intermediate-range Pershing II missile and currently produces parts for the long-range MX missile.

All shipments from the site with containers large enough to carry a missile, or the longest missile stage, must be declared. Containers which are declared to carry missiles are subject to weighing and measuring. Eight times each year the inspecting party has the right to ask that the container be opened so that the type of missile can be checked. All vehicles are subject to inspection to check whether they are large enough to carry the missile in question. If the vehicle is large enough for that purpose it is subject to internal inspection.

#### *On-Site Inspection's Debut*

On-site inspection has traditionally been advocated by the US and resisted by the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union finally agreed to short-notice inspections in the INF Treaty negotiations, the reality of the system struck home for the first time in the US. The implications of Soviet inspectors at sensitive US military installations led

to a debate about the degree to which this form of inspection was required. The result was a shift in the US position to more limited forms of on-site inspection. This shift was made possible when the two sides agreed to move away from a treaty which would have left one hundred remaining warheads, to pursue the complete elimination of all missiles in this category. It is easier to verify the complete elimination of a system, since *any* prohibited part of the system thereafter constitutes a violation. In the case of retaining one hundred warheads, the production, storage and deployment sites would have to be continuously monitored.

The successful implementation of the on-site inspection provisions in this Treaty is an important precedent for other arms control negotiations. For years the US has advocated on-site inspection and pointed to the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to agree to such measures as an indication of the Soviet lack of seriousness about arms control. However, the recent resistance of US policymakers to Soviet inspectors on US soil must also be taken into consideration and will probably play a role in other arms control negotiations.

### COOPERATIVE MEASURES OF VERIFICATION

Towards the end of the INF negotiations, the Soviet Union informed the US that the first stage of the SS-25

**Table I Summary of Inspection Provisions**

Inspection Type	Team Size	Prior Notification	Frequency Duration
Baseline (Article XI,3)	10	16 hours	begin after 30 days, end 60 days later
Facility Elimination (XI, 4)	10	16 hours	done within 60 days of notification of elimination
Short-Notice (XI, 5)	10	16 hours	lasts 13 years, 20/yr for 3 yrs, 15/yr for 5 years, 10/yr for 5 years
Portal Monitoring (XI,6)	30	n/a	lasts 13 years begins after first 30 days
Elimination Process (XI,7)	20	72 hours	3 years
Completion of Elimination Process (XI,8)	20	72 hours	3 years