

of units from the middle and small powers to the exclusion of the permanent Members because the latter may have a direct interest in the conflict and might attempt to exert undue influence. This principle has been circumvented due to extenuating circumstances in the cases of British troops in Cyprus, French troops in Lebanon and a very small number of Soviet and American personnel in UNTSO in the Middle East.

These matters of composition, may, however, clash with the sixth principle, namely that there be adequate geographic representation on peacekeeping operations from East, West and the Third World. This has not always been possible because communist states have either not offered to participate, or have been judged unacceptable by one or more parties. The matters of equitable geographical composition and of consent must be resolved in each case.

The remarkable fact, however, is that some fifty-four countries have contributed to UN peacekeeping forces. Closer scrutiny shows that the actual numbers are in decline. The reasons are varied. Many states do not have sufficient numbers of adequately trained personnel, especially for dangerous service in the Middle East. There is also the matter of finances. Will the contributor countries be adequately reimbursed? Unfortunately many Member States have not paid their peacekeeping assessments, placing the UN in a difficult financial position. While some small countries which contribute troops are motivated by payment, others, like Canada, are seldom fully paid. One can argue that the cost of peacekeeping is a pittance in comparison to national defence budgets. Nonetheless, this is a decision that each government must make for itself.

The seventh principle relates to the issue of command and control, historically a very contentious issue. Who runs the operation? This is not a simple question. There are fifteen states on the Security Council, five of which are the permanent Members. These five all have representatives on the Military Staff Committee, which, under the Charter, is supposed to manage military affairs. In practice, this has been found to be impracticable. What has evolved over time is that the Secretary-General appoints the Commander, who is approved by the permanent Members. The Secretary-General directs overall policy from his office in New York through his Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs. Both are always sensitive to and consult with the members of the Security Council in initial situations.

There have been many disputes over command and control. In the Congo in 1960, the USSR accused the Secretary-General of partisanship when he refused to allow Soviet aircraft, carrying military supplies to one of the political factions, to land. The question of impartiality will always be present where, as is almost invariably the case, East and West may be supporting opposite sides in the conflict being supervised by UN

forces. In the Congo case, the USSR refused to pay its assessment for the operation, as it also refused to pay for UNEF I. As a consequence, in 1964 the UN was pushed close to a state of paralysis over this issue.

The matter of financing, the seventh principle, took many years to resolve. It was not until 1973 that a formula of scaled assessments was adopted for UNEF II; the wealthier states paying more, the poorer states less. The same arrangement was later adopted for UNDOF on the Golan Heights and for UNIFIL in Lebanon. Even so, the actual resolution of 1973 declares that an arrangement be adopted "without prejudice to the positions of principle that may be taken by Member States"; meaning that they could later change their policies. Finance is a continuing problem. One could foresee instances, however, in which the major powers, particularly the superpowers were jointly so strongly committed that they would ensure that an operation be properly financed.

The total cost of UN peacekeeping from 1948 to 1985 was \$3 billion. The accumulated deficits amount to over two hundred million dollars. But many states are in arrears and others simply refuse to pay for specific operations. There is no means to force states to pay. The frequent argument is that the aggressor should pay the costs. In no case, apart from the unique case of Korea, has a resolution named any party in a conflict as an aggressor. On the one hand it is difficult, if not impossible, to know how and when an act of aggression actually begins. The criteria which define an aggressive act include, among several items, the types of provocation and the issue of naming the initiator of the attack. On the other hand, it would be politically counter-productive to label a country an aggressor. That country would then be very likely to withhold its consent for the operation and refuse to co-operate.

MANDATES AND FUNCTIONS

The most important and dramatic function of UN peacekeeping is the interposition of neutral force to supervise a cease-fire. This was the case on four occasions in the Middle East, each following the outbreak of war, and in Cyprus because of civil violence between two antagonistic communities. The language of the mandates authorizing these operations is, as in all other cases, very sparse. In the heat of a crisis the fifteen members on the Security Council are unlikely to agree on anything more than the minimum objectives. Any attempt to go beyond them, and define details would generate disagreement and possibly ruin the whole process. Sample mandates read: for UNEF II, "Demands that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed . . . [and] Decides to set up immediately . . . a United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel drawn from state members of the United Nations except the permanent members of