

the security functions of the UN. When collective security, as envisaged in the Charter, was actually put into operation, there was a lot of shock and horror in many quarters to say – “we never thought it was about this.”

Enid Schoettle: It is not only Canada that has that point of view. There is great concern in a number of the non-permanent five countries that they are reluctant to make commitments of forces under Chapter VII provisions, without any sense of how it is going to materialize without the protection of veto. So I suspect that the Canadian view is rather widely shared.

Gharekhan: I am not sure that the non-aligned countries would be enthusiastic to enter into any agreement with the Security Council to give troops to be used for the national interests of the veto powers. The five permanent members, because of their veto, would not agree to any operation which goes against their interests. I am not sure that India – well I am sure that India – would not wish to make any troops available, the deployment of which India would have no control over. Troops which would be used, as Amre Moussa said, as an instrument of US foreign policy.

In this Gulf Crisis, the US was able to use the Security Council because the situation is so blatantly obvious. Here is a clear case of aggression by one country against another. And there was an international consensus that, yes, this is absolutely wrong and must be reversed. I must compliment the US in the professional way in which they went about mobilizing in-

“There is nothing magic about the Security Council, it is just a place where some kind of systemic politics gets played out.”

ternational support – very reluctantly in some country’s cases. But I doubt whether the US would be able to use the Council as an instrument of its foreign policy in other situations where the case is not so obvious. But I do agree that the US would want to use the Security Council. Les Aspin [Chairman of the US House Armed Services Committee] said just three days ago, in the *Washington Post*, that one of the things that should come out of the Gulf War is that the US should be in the posi-

tion to use the UN as an instrument of foreign policy. The intention is very clear.

Urquhart: I very much agree that the use of the word renaissance is extremely premature. I also very much distrust the now very fashionable use of the phrase “New World Order.” I think that everything, almost, has to be done before we can begin to justify either of those phrases. It is absolutely true that the Iraq-Kuwait crisis is unique in its clarity. Except for Iraq’s attack on Iran – about which incidently the Security Council, in one of its lowest moments did absolutely nothing.

It isn’t really a bureaucratic or an organizational problem, early warning and preemptive action. I spent some forty years in the UN with various Secretaries General trying to alert the Council in advance to things that were obviously going to happen. The Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 for example, even the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Lebanese Civil War – on all of those occasions the Council was totally resistant to preemptive action of any kind. They didn’t want to attract trouble. ORCI [Office for Research and Collection of Information] – it was set up after I left, I was always against it – is a very large bureaucratic organization. It doesn’t address the real problem. The real problem in getting the Security Council to be a sort of preventive system is the attitudes of governments. For various reasons of their own they mostly don’t want to try to take action before something happens.

It is very nice now for the United States to say that we are planning a new world order; it just happens to suit them extremely well. What happens if something happens somewhere else which doesn’t suit them that well?

One of the difficulties of the Security Council is that the different elements of its functioning have always been separated up to now. There is the diplomatic side, then there is so-called peacemaking – people like the Secretary General and others trying to exercise good offices in different disputes. Then there is peacekeeping, and then there is collective action. And they have always been kept very separate, particularly peacekeeping and collective action, for good political reasons. Now there is no reason.

I submit that a system would consist of a combination of those four main activities so

that one supplements the other. For example, if a peacekeeping operation gets run over by a government, like for example the peacekeeping forces in South Lebanon did in 1982, in the mandate of that peacekeeping operation that should automatically trigger collective action from the Security Council. Then peacekeeping would not be just this very decent bunch of chaps in blue helmets behaving extraordinarily well in difficult situations. If they got trampled

“The Security Council is becoming the political arm of US foreign policy, like the IMF and the World Bank.”

on, they would become a tripwire. Until you get governments prepared to consider that kind of thing there isn’t any point in talking about a renaissance or new world order. People are talking nonsense at the moment. Especially these very sort of upbeat notes emanating from Washington – it just isn’t true.

Wood: The Devil’s Advocacy said there’s more hierarchy than ever, and that you don’t just have permanent members, you have one super permanent member, and then you have all the rest in varying categories. But I haven’t heard anybody say it is time to open up the Charter again and try for a less hierarchical structure.

Moussa: This would come automatically if the debate is open and we enter a really sincere debate on this issue. Then we might reach that point. But we have to bear in mind that many countries, the small countries in particular, Third World countries in their entirety, are against opening the Charter for amendment – for fear of dropping certain principles, of certain guarantees, that are there and we might not be able to reach a consensus on those principles again. So opening up the Charter is a very serious, very dangerous, operation.

On the question of preventative action, what about Article 99 – the right of the Secretary General to call a Security Council meeting whenever he considers that there is a threat to international peace and security? If the Secretary General got information, solid information, from the United States, from the Soviet Union, from France, from whoever, that secret services have determined that forces of Iraq are moving in a way that they might be attacking