

place, the Soviet Union lacks a well developed and varied array of instruments with which to implement its objectives in the Third World. The effectiveness of ideology as an instrument of policy has declined as the Soviet revolution has lost its élan and as the utility of the Soviet model as a strategy for economic development has increasingly been called in question. The Soviet Union's capacity to employ economic instruments (trade and aid) to further its aims is severely restricted in a general sense by the structure of the Soviet economy (the lack of surplus capacity and goods in a centrally planned full employment regime), by the small size of its economy relative to that of its principal rival, by the comparative insignificance of the Soviet Union in international trade and finance (particularly as these concern the South) and by the inconvertibility of its currency. More specifically, Soviet economic performance is uneven. In the early and mid-1960s, and more evidently in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviet Union has faced serious resource allocation problems and has had a dismal growth performance. In such circumstances, there simply is not a great deal left over to go around. Moreover, the Soviets have learned that the attempt to cement ties with Third World and other regimes by economic means can be a very costly proposition.<sup>14</sup>

Although Soviet diplomatic and cultural ties with Third World states have expanded dramatically in the past three decades, the Soviet Union remains at a disadvantage compared to the Western powers in its use of diplomacy to pursue its objectives, since it lacks the profound historical and cultural affinities which link Third World élites to the ex-colonial powers and to the United States. Attempts to foster such links through, for example, educational exchange (such as the Patrice Lumumba University) have often been counterproductive, as Third World élites gain direct exposure to the less attractive aspects of Soviet society. This relative lack of Soviet ties with established élites has strengthened the emphasis it places on developing relations with counter-élites, and with revolutionary groups committed to substantial alteration of the political and economic status quo of Third World societies. This emphasis, which is based on ideology, has further complicated Soviet efforts to establish rewarding and longlasting relations with Third World regimes.

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<sup>14</sup> The combined cost in the early 1980s of Soviet assistance to Vietnam and Cuba ranges between \$11 and \$18 million US a day. Figures derived from S. Simon, "The Superpower in Southeast Asia: A Security Assessment" (Paper presented at the March 1984 meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia), pp. 19-20.