

glad to have your views on the situation and to learn whether, having in mind the requirements of various theatres of war, it will be possible to strengthen those features of our home defence position which Chiefs of Staff's analysis has shown to be inadequate.

Part II follows immediately.

Skelton Papers 391

97.

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*

Ottawa, March 2, 1941

TELEGRAM 36

MOST SECRET. Part II. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister, Begins. Following is brief appreciation by Chiefs of Staff Committee of defence position as of February 24th. Begins.

1. The probable Forms and Scales of Attack, which have been and are now accepted by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, in respect to direct action against Canadian territory and territorial waters, are given in the Defence of Canada Plan, dated August 1940, Part I.<sup>1</sup> These are generally as follows:

*Atlantic Coast*—bombardment by a capital ship; one or two 8" cruisers; or by a merchant raider mounting 6" guns; attack by submarines and small surface craft; attack by small raiding parties; torpedo, bomb or gas attack by shipborne or long-range shore-based aircraft on sea-borne, coastal and inland objectives.

*Pacific Coast*—similar to the above but on a smaller scale and lesser intensity.

2. It will be particularly noted that the Chiefs of Staff Committee do not anticipate any attempt at invasion by actual or potential hostile Powers. It is the opinion of the Committee that no such attempt would be feasible so long as the defence of the British Isles successfully continues. Even should Germany succeed in overcoming the resistance of our Empire Forces and the conquest of the United Kingdom ensue, there is still no probability that a large scale attack on these shores, with a view to invasion, is a contingency we need anticipate or plan for. A German-dominated Europe, and an Eastern Asia controlled by Japan, could wield such tremendous economic pressure that there would be no need on the part of enemy Powers to attempt a most difficult military invasion in order to force Canada (and the United States) eventually to accept humiliating terms of peace.

3. On the other hand, the greater the need for Germany to obtain a quick decision—and this situation increasingly obtains—and the more important and effective the assistance given by the United States to the British Empire countries, the more obvious it must become to Hitler that no consideration on his part can deter the United States from pursuing a course aimed at his eventual overwhelming defeat. In these circumstances, every

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduct.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.