for January 24. The Strategic Air Command announced that an investigation into the crash would take as long as two months — at which time a statement on the findings would be released (Globe and Mail, January 24). While the first test had been termed "successful," no mention had been made as to whether the interception capabilities of fighter aircraft had been effective.

NORAD Defence Arrangements

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In Washington, D.C., on a fact-finding mission in early December, members of a Commons committee on external affairs and national defence gathered evidence prior to the renewal of the Canada-US NORAD defence agreement. Committee members were provided with information by a private US citizen, William Arkin, a defence analyst with the Institute for Policy Studies, on eight separate agreements censored out of documents provided to the committee by the Canadian government. Most of the censored material (portions of a document prepared by the Department of National Defence [DND] entitled Canada-US Arrangements in Regard to Defence, Defence Production, Defence Sharing) related to cooperation with respect to nuclear weapons. While still in Washington, committee members expressed their "dismay," with committee chairman William Winegard (PC, Guelph) noting his "disappointment" that information available to the committee in the US could not have been obtainable in Canada (Globe and Mail, December 4). Mr. Arkin had supplied the committee with material missing from the list supplied by the Canadian government which had been designated "classified." Mr. Arkin also told the committee that various other bilateral agreements were not included in the complete list prepared by DND, since Canada was "intertwined with virtually every aspect of American strategic policy," including SDI development.

Speaking in a CBC interview December 3, Mr. Arkin had stated that the Commons committee, with its broad mandate to examine the future of Canada-US defence cooperation, could not operate effectively "with blinkers on." The committee could not focus on the fact that "NORAD is spelled with an 'N' and SDI is spelt with an 'S' " and assume the two were not connected, he said. The committee had to look at the complete context of Canada-US relations. Huge volumes of bilateral military agreements, arrangements and technical cooperative documents were, he said, "really beyond political scrutiny" (CBC Radio [External Affairs transcript], December 3).

Despite Mr. Arkin's warnings of linkage between NORAD and SDI (see "International Canada" for October and November 1985), committee chairman William Winegard stated that briefings from Pentagon and State Department officials in Washington had indicated no Canadian link to SDI under "current arrangements with regard to NORAD" (The Citizen, December 4). Mr. Winegard added that Canada would not be "dragged" into SDI, but could only be involved through "specific government-to-government agreement." However, committee member Pauline Jewett (NDP external affairs critic) stated that the reason no link presently existed between NORAD and SDI was because no SDI presently existed.

Responding in the Commons December 4 to opposition criticism of the withholding of information from the

committee, Defence Minister Erik Nielsen stated that there existed "classified documents . . .that go to the heart of the nation's security and that of our allies, the disclosure of which traditions prevent." He stressed that the information had only been made available by a private US citizen through an unidentified leak, rather than through any agency of the US government. The Minister "emphatically rejected" the accusation that the government was withholding information "which the committee was entitled to have." Mr. Nielsen offered to consider both *in camera* briefings of the committee and the release of classified information should such a request be received from the committee.

External Affairs Minister Joe Clark indicated that should the Commons committee, upon completion of its investigation, deem it advisable to insert a clause in any renewed NORAD agreement stating that the agreement formed no part of SDI, the government would not be in opposition (Globe and Mail, December 5). (An original clause dissociating NORAD from active ballistic missile defence systems had been deleted in 1981.) However, Mr. Clark acknowledged that current US research into SDI could change the role of NORAD should research ever lead to a deployment phase. However, US General Robert Herres, Commander-in-Chief of the North American Aerospace Defence Command, reassured the committee December 11 that Canada would never be drawn into SDI deployment through NORAD. General Herres stated that any reinsertion of the dissociative clause in the NORAD agreement would be "totally redundant and completely unnecessary" (Globe and Mail, December 12). Insertion would only create "uncertainty and confusion about what it meant," he added.

By late January, the Commons committee had developed a draft report which recommended against reinstatement of the controversial clause. At the same time, the draft report supported a renewal of NORAD for a period of five years. Also included were recommendations to double Canadian defence spending, increase Canada-US cooperation on Arctic surveillance and initiate a Canadian military space program for the improvement of surveillance capabilities (*The Citizen*, January 23).

DeHavilland Sale

A request was made in the Commons December 3 by Bob Kaplan (Lib., York Centre) for a parliamentary review of the sale of Canada's crown-owned de Havilland aerospace manufacturer to US-owned Boeing Commercial Aircraft. Treasury Board President Robert de Cotret responded that the sale would "not only strengthen de Havilland but would strengthen the entire aerospace industry in Canada and provide for secure jobs which already exist." Opposition critics were quick to point out that the selling price of \$155 million might be substantially reduced through an option whereby a \$65 million note (repayable over fifteen years) could be cut by \$1 million for every \$5 million invested in new orders to Canadian suppliers (Globe and Mail, December 3). (The remaining \$90 million was to be paid in cash.) In addition, the new owner would continue to benefit from all available government programs, tax benefits and product insurance support. Mr. de Cotret stressed that the sale would save Canadian