

solution of which millions of men have given their lives and wealth and prosperity of so many nations have been destroyed, there lies a spirit of insincerity which, disregarding what people are and want, gives way to momentary political expediency--source of all calamities and fruitful root for new and unending conflicts.

Universality, security, and right: this is then what Ecuador demands of an international organization worthy of a world in which our aspirations of peace and justice might become a reality.

Applying these principles to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, we maintain that it is necessary to embody in its principles those without which the Charter of the world organization would be shorn of ideals. Unless the supremacy of moral law is recognized as the guiding rule of conduct of states; unless their juridical equality is proclaimed beyond those practical or political inequalities which stand between them; unless force is prescribed as a method of settling international conflicts; unless internal and external sovereign rights of states are respected within the limits imposed by the obligations arising from the interdependence of members of the international community; unless the principle of non-intervention is upheld as the full expression of that respect, the covenant of the future association of states will have no greater value than as a document maintained in force by a system of political equilibrium exercised by the Government subscribing and ratifying it, susceptible of becoming disjointed and falling apart at the first sign of reciprocal incompatibility among the forces supporting it.

On the other hand, if the internal democracy of states aims at transmitting its essence to international existence, it is advisable that the General Assembly of the Organization be established as the organ directly representing all the states composing it and that it be endowed with the authority and powers of which the Dumbarton Oaks plan is so greatly lacking, so that within the framework of its functions it might be enabled to lay down the principles and rules of international law or to amend them progressively, thus becoming in a way an international legislative power.

Ecuador agrees with the requirement that the responsibility to maintain peace and international security rest with the Council of the Organization, granting it sufficient authority to accomplish this. But in the realm of ethical values any responsibility must be enforceable. Consequently,

it is imperative to confer on the General Assembly the supervision of the fulfillment of the obligations pertaining to the Council.

It would be highly plausible to increase the number of members of the Security Council, granting a numerically superior representation to small states in order to strengthen that organ, situating its roots in universal public opinion and with due respect to the system of proportion of representation.

Concerning the voting arrangement in the Council, an earnest analysis leads us to declare it unacceptable that the majority required for decisions concerning questions other than those of procedure, that is the most important ones, should include the vote of all permanent members since this is equivalent to breaking the principle of juridical equality among states, reducing those who have no permanent seats to a deplorable and unjust condition of inferiority and, even more deplorably, to provoke the collapse of the functions of the Council in the not impossible case that any one of its permanent members should wish to interfere with its smooth running.

In such a strange situation, we would have not an association of states, but the almighty will of a single state against the consensus of the others, that is, an undeniable example of anarchy within a seemingly internationally organized world.

Likewise subject to criticism is the right granted to members of the Council to vote on decisions concerning preventive or repressive measures to be undertaken against acts of aggression which they themselves might commit while such right is denied in the case of controversies of lesser significance to which they may be a party.

This break in the unity of the regime whereby the vote is denied in less serious decisions of the Council while it is permitted in the more serious and urgent cases, coupled with the proposed majority requirement, presents a possible case where the collective security system may be powerless to repel or to avoid aggression or the threat of aggression by a member state of the Security Council.

Under these circumstances, the seed of aggression would fall on fertile soil to be harvested in future deadly wars which the Organization could neither avoid nor check from its position of mere spectator.