

- Par. 46, and 56 &c. and 77 and 79. 11. What Naval Depôt or Depôts should be established on the Lakes? What works would be necessary at such Depôt or Depôts, and what would be their probable cost? What class and what number of vessels would be required, and what would be their probable cost?
- Par. 10, 19 & 20. 12. Which are the principal points of strategic importance in Upper Canada?
- Par. 10. 13. Do you not consider Kingston an important point in the defence of Upper Canada, both in a Military and Naval point of view?
- Par. 46 & 56, and 77 & 79. 14. Assuming the answer to the foregoing query to be in the affirmative, what additional works, if any, and what naval force would, in your opinion, be required to insure the command of Lake Ontario?
- Par. 68. 15. What number and description of troops would be required for the defence of Kingston with such additional works, &c.?
- Par. 19 & 20. 16. Assuming the necessary fortifications erected at Kingston, together with a sufficient naval force to command the Lake, what steps could be taken to defend the Western Peninsula, and to secure the safety of the forces engaged there in the event of their being compelled to retire on Hamilton or Toronto?
- Par. 50, &c. 17. Would it be possible by holding Kingston to protect the naval force employed on Lake Ontario? And for what length of time might Kingston be expected to hold out, supposing communication to be cut off from Montreal, and Kingston itself invested?
- Par. 15 & 16. 18. Would an enemy be able to maintain himself in force, during the winter before Montreal or Kingston, or would he be compelled to retire? In the event of the enemy retiring, would the forces supposed to be in Montreal and Kingston be able unaided to re-open their communications between the two cities, either directly or by the Rideau Canal?
- Par. 15. certainly. 19. Should the enemy desire to prevent the forces at Montreal and Kingston from thus re-opening their communications, what probable amount of force would he be obliged to maintain in the district between those two cities?
- Par. 20. 20. Were an American army to cross the lines between Windsor or Amherstburg and Port Sarnia, what steps could be taken to oppose their advance into the country? Supposing a sufficient body of Militia to be available, where would be the best point for first offering resistance to the enemy, and what works would be required at that point?
- Par. 20. 21. If driven back from that point, in what direction should the Canadian force retire? And where ought its next rallying place to be? What defensive works would be required at that point?
- Par. 20. 22. Were an American army to cross the lines at Niagara, what steps could be taken to oppose their advance into the country? Where would be the best point for first offering resistance? What works should be erected there? On what place should the force, if defeated, fall back?
- Par. 19. 23. Would Hamilton be an important point of defence in Upper Canada? If so, what works would be required there, and what would be their probable cost?
- Par. 19. 24. Would Toronto be an important point of defence, and, if so, what works would be required there, and what would be their probable cost?
- Par. 19 and 20. 25. Would it be, in your opinion, possible with the troops and resources at the command of the Government of Canada, to devise a plan of defence for the Western Peninsula, by which the enemy could be met at the frontier, and by which the Canadian force, if defeated, could fall back from point to point on a concerted line of communication on its own base of supplies?
- This question is dealt with generally in the 1st and 2nd parts of the report. 26. If the defence of the whole Western Peninsula, as proposed in the last question, be impracticable, to what point should the defensive measures of the country be mainly confined?

I have the honour to be,
Sir,

Your most obedient servant,
(Signed) Wm. McDougall,
Secretary.