

3. As bad news comes in from Korea, a feeling of uneasiness is developing that the United States, whose action at the beginning was universally applauded, has been caught completely by surprise and is not in a position to take sufficiently effective action after recovery from that surprise. It is recalled that the United States had indicated that Korea was not a first line of defence any more than Formosa was. In the event, however, the United States took up the challenge, quite rightly and very speedily, but without resources to meet it, at least immediately. There is also uneasiness, which is certainly shared in the Department, that the Administration may become involved with Communist China as a result of its decision to neutralize Formosa. As you know, the Communists in China have taken up this challenge, as they call it and it has given them a superficial case for assisting the North Koreans. Furthermore, excited and emotional statements in Congress and elsewhere, especially the suggestion that an atom bomb should be dropped on North Korea, does not strengthen confidence here that the United States people will be able to face the problems ahead with steadiness and determination. I agree that, as the situation deteriorates in the field, with Americans alone fighting, they will become somewhat impatient with formal insistence on the United Nations character of the operations. However, if we are to keep this country united, and if we are to limit our intervention to Korea alone, which is our only obligation in the present circumstances, we must continue to emphasize, at every appropriate occasion, that we are participating solely in a United Nations operation and that that operation is solely for the defence of Korea. If the Americans get irritated over this, that will be unfortunate, but unavoidable. If they express that irritation, which I hope they will not, there will be, I am afraid, a quick reaction in the press here, reminding them that Canadians, and other countries of the Commonwealth, have had experience in the past of fighting rear-guard actions against superior forces without United States armed support. We must do all we can on both sides to avoid this kind of thing developing. I think that they could help in Washington if the President or the Secretary of State would make a strong statement to the effect that they also are concerned only with United Nations action in Korea, and that if the Chinese Communists become involved, it will be entirely on their own responsibility and not as the result of any provocation on Washington's part; that the statement about Formosa was meant merely to neutralize that island and to prevent it becoming implicated in the Korean situation. I know that both the British and the French are disturbed over the possibility of Korean developments spreading to China.

4. I hope also that there will be no public and official appeals from Washington for assistance; at least to those countries which fought throughout World War II, and, especially, to those who have already made contributions to the Korean conflict. General Bradley's mysterious reference to offers of land forces — couched in such vague terms — has already caused much speculation and some embarrassment here.