

5. President Truman is correct in distinguishing between the scientific development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and the secret of the manufacture of the atomic bomb. The latter is a military secret differing greatly in degree but not in kind from the military secrets which the Russians themselves would never think of divulging to anyone. It is only when the possession of this secret is used as a club to reinforce arguments around the council table and to justify the attitude of "the tough school" that their reactions become violent. Little would have been said on the Soviet side if the United States Government had announced at the outset that the secret of the atomic bomb would be brought up for discussion in the Security Council of the United Nations Organization once it was established, but in the meantime discussions would take place between the three countries in possession of the scientific knowledge to decide upon the common policy they would adopt in regard to their responsibilities for this revolutionary development. How much better this would have been than public rejoicing over the reduction of the Soviet Union to a second-class power and the pious declaration about the "sacred trust".

6. The attitude of the tough school is well illustrated in secret despatch No. 2407 of October 10th from the Canadian Ambassador at Washington.[†] In this despatch Mr. Pearson gives a summary of a telegram from Mr. George F. Kennan, then Chargé d'Affaires of the United States Embassy at Moscow, which Mr. Freeman Matthews showed him. I have very great respect for the ability of Mr. Kennan and for his deep knowledge of the Soviet Union, but he suffers from having been here in the pre-war days when foreign representatives became indoctrinated with anti-Soviet ideas as a result of the purges and subtle German propaganda. He is one of the proponents of toughness as the proper tactics to adopt towards the Soviet Union.

7. In his telegram to Washington Mr. Kennan paints a picture of serious Russian concern over the set-back they received at the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. I cannot detect any chagrin here over the failure of Soviet tactics. On the contrary I see the Russian people impressed with the success Mr. Molotov achieved in preventing himself from being bullied about. What did the Russian people expect after all they had already gained? The only thing they may not have achieved is the age-long dream of domination over the Dardanelles, but they realise this cannot be obtained except through success in another major war for which they will not be ready for a generation or more. Far from bringing new blood into the Kremlin, as Mr. Kennan predicts, we find the old clique as prominent as ever at the November 7th celebrations, except that Stalin and his supposed favourite in the eyes of the State Department — Zdanov — were conspicuous by their absence. Molotov on the other hand — presumably the scapegoat of the London Conference — was the central figure. So much for the thesis of Soviet stock-taking after the events in London.

8. If we have to talk, like Mr. Kennan, in the parlance of American football I would say that the Soviet team after three brilliantly executed forward passes — Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam — scored three easy touchdowns. Then with