

The Morocco incident served at least to test Britain's attitude. The war party in Germany was eager for war, the Crown Prince applauded publicly von Heydebrand's fiery speech. But the Kaiser held off, as he has done on more than one occasion. For the last two years, however, Great Britain has been figuring in the publications of the *Alldeutsch* or Pan-Germanic party as the irreconcilable enemy, no less than France or Russia, of German interests. Many of the well-known *Politik* series of pamphlets are directed against "England." In one of them (*England's Weltherrschaft und die Deutsche Luxusflotte*), the writer tells his countrymen that to increase their army is not enough, they must also have a navy capable of coping with that of Great Britain in order to secure their "share of the world." (*Welterbe*). Then he proceeds to reassure them as to the ultimate issue of this contest:

"Now some over-anxious souls may think that England will always be able to surpass us in naval construction, so that all our efforts will be in vain—the relative numbers will remain always the same.

" . . . These ideas are those of people whose information is decades behind the times. . . . We have steadily and continuously, and with less expenditure of money than England's, been approaching her strength upon the sea. Let us compare the numerical growth of British and German line-of-battleships from 1898 to 1912. At first we stood as 1 to 6, the British fleet being more than six times as strong as we; two years later the ratio was 1 to 4.8; four years later, 1 to 3½; after two years more, 1 to 2½, and today (1912) England is not more than twice as strong as we. It is an almost silent struggle the world significance and greatness of which later centuries will know how to appreciate. . . . England will not always be able to keep up the ratio of 2 to 1. Work is higher paid in England than with us, and once we have got the desired number of sixty great ships-of-the-line she will not be able, from financial reasons, to construct 120 dreadnoughts, and besides she has not the inexhaustible reservoir of men which universal conscription provides."

The failure of Napoleon to master Europe because of his inferiority at sea is then referred to, an illustration which seems to betray the ideal of conquest in the writer's mind. Then he explains why the German fleet must be capable of coping with the British fleet before France can be attacked with the certainty of success:

Like a cavalry division on the right wing of our army, the (German) fleet must undertake the protection of its flank by an