

fore, of the blame attachable to this failure, must rest where fidelity of narration has obliged me to place it.

Again, the recall of the victorious detachment from the left to the right bank of the Mississippi, and the consequent abandonment of that complete command of the river which this partial success had obtained, was a military error of the gravest kind. Great as our numerical loss had been in the principal action of the 8th, the advantages of position were, at the close of the day, so decidedly with us, that for General Jackson to maintain himself any longer in front of New Orleans was physically impossible. His own despatch, indeed, addressed to the Secretary at War, shows, that he felt the truth so forcibly, that he had actually issued orders for a retreat, when the removal of the English from his menaced flank was reported to him; and his battalions, which had begun to get under arms, were directed to resume their places. It is, however, but just to state, that such was the miserable condition of our commissariat, that the fleet contained not provisions enough to feed the people, on half rations, during a quick passage to Cuba: and General Lambert did not feel that he would be justified in risking the total loss of his army, which, had the campaign been pro-