

paper may loosely be termed "confidence-building measures." It is noted that additional measures of the type negotiated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), recently expanded in the Stockholm Agreement of 1986, may be applicable to Northern Europe and its adjacent sea areas (as well as, possibly, the North Pacific), but are less relevant to the central Polar Basin or to the security concerns of a country such as Canada. Rather, two specific proposals for "stand-off zones" — aerial and submarine — are advanced as possibly negotiable contributions to enhancing the security of the Arctic region more broadly. Finally, also under the rubric of "confidence-building measures," the paper briefly examines the prospects of ballistic missile submarine sanctuaries or "ASW-free zones" designed to enhance the survivability of the sea-based deterrent. While an Arctic-wide zone of this kind may be impractical, given the verification difficulties, more geographically limited zones within the Arctic region would be useful and may hold some promise of future negotiability. In particular, there would seem to be a logical tradeoff between quite extensive submarine stand-off zones around North America and more restricted SSBN sanctuaries in waters adjoining the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, the paper recommends that, rather than focusing on broad and comprehensive schemes of denuclearization or demilitarization, Arctic arms control efforts should be directed at such measures as a demilitarization of the ice and surface waters of the central Polar Basin; aerial and submarine "stand-off" zones; and geographically limited sanctuaries for strategic ballistic missile-carrying submarines. In particular, given its expressed commitment to limiting the "excessive militarization" of the Arctic, it is hoped that the Canadian Government will begin to explore thoroughly the possibilities of negotiating, or encouraging the negotiation of, more modest measures of this type.