particularly in view of the on-going superpower negotiations to reduce substantially their strategic arsenals.

In matters of sovereignty, the Government also needs to elaborate its intention to "maintain the natural unity of the Canadian Arctic archipelago and to preserve Canada's sovereignty over land, sea and ice undiminished and undivided" (Clark, 10 September 1985). Canada has few, if any, supporters amongst the traditional maritime states and its major allies in NATO for our position on the North West Passage. In addition, the Nordic states are extremely conscious of Soviet claims in the North-East Passage, and will resist any strengthening of those claims. Canada may find therefore that its main support in this assertion of sovereignty comes from the Soviet Union. If the issue is to be taken to the International Court at some stage, Canada's presence in the area will need to be made clear.

In these circumstances, a case can be made that Canada ought to place less emphasis on sovereignty and more on the future of the Arctic region. This approach would include both a national strategy for development which would build on the measures announced by the Government in September 1985, and a multilateral strategy to address issues of peace and security in the Arctic. The zone of peace recently proposed by Mr. Gorbachev may not be acceptable to the Canadian and US governments, but the proposal does provide an opportunity to consider seriously the possibilities for restricting military activity in the Arctic. Generating international support for Canada's national objectives in the Arctic should be a priority task for the years ahead.