

the COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee whereas the CD had a specific mandate for disarmament. While there clearly was an overlap in responsibilities, the distinction must be maintained between the responsibilities of the two organizations. Exploration of some link between the Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS and the CD was suggested by one participant. Another participant indicated that there were difficulties in how the CD could pursue its mandate because of a lack of detailed experience on the subject, coupled with a deficiency of factual information. Legal expertise must follow technical expertise and it was advocated that a group of experts to study the technical aspects of the prevention of an arms race in outer space be set up.

Concern was expressed by some participants that the CD was focussing too much on definitions when the deployment of weapons into space seemed imminent. There was a need to accelerate CD efforts, to discuss types of agreements whether comprehensive or specific. The world was moving rapidly towards more complex space technologies requiring more stringent legal controls. Fortunately, the sophistication of the means of controlling these technologies has also increased.

Others felt that this approach was too alarmist since no early deployment of weapons into space is in prospect and such deployment would need to be subject to agreement. Realistically, any agreement between the USA and USSR would be the mainstay of an outer space arms control regime.

Another question raised was the difference between the "common heritage of mankind" concept and that of the "province of all mankind". It was pointed out that some states rejected the "common heritage" concept. There was also a legal distinction between "common" and "province" in that the former specifically denotes common ownership and equal rights by everyone.

A number of speakers addressed the question of verification. One participant favoured space-to-ground and on-site means (pre-launch notification and the checking of ground instrumentalities) over space-to-space verification which was considered too costly. It was pointed out that while it was conceptually possible to camouflage a satellite on the ground to fool an inspector, it would be very difficult and costly to do so.

Several participants noted that PAXSAT would be only one part of a wider verification scheme. It was thought that PAXSAT might offer an opportunity of maintaining a certain degree of secrecy with a minimum loss of sovereignty. PAXSAT 'A' would identify that satellite X is doing function Y, and would then enable states parties to seek any required clarifications.