

In any event, one of the hirelings of Col. Robert McCormick of Chicago, arranged to see Gouzenko who told him that he had some valuable dope on spies which he would make available to Senator Jenner. Senator Jenner, who hails from McCormick country, asked the State Department to ask our Department of External Affairs if arrangements could be made to have Gouzenko appear before his committee as a witness. My belief is that, at this point, our Government made a mistake, which makes all the more striking the public reaction which followed. The Government sent officials to see Gouzenko. They reported that he had changed his mind since he had been interviewed by the Chicago Tribune, and that he really had nothing to add to the information which had long before been transmitted to Washington. The Government therefore sent a note to Washington which, though not a blunt refusal of the request made, was something akin to a refusal.

My own belief is that it would have been wiser to have taken another tack. Gouzenko is, after all, a Canadian citizen with all the rights of citizenship. If he wanted to appear before a congressional committee, that was his business, that he was a free agent. The Government should have said so, at the same time pointing out, that if Mr. Gouzenko sought to make such an appearance, it would be obviously impossible to continue the special protection which he and his family had been receiving since his departure from the Soviet embassy in 1945. No one could have objected to that, for Gouzenko could hardly expect to have his bread buttered on both sides in the shape of television appearances in Washington on the one hand and continued shelter from the outside world on the other. If Gouzenko felt that the danger period had passed, and that he and his family could live without fear, he could then come and go as he pleased, and appear before any committee in Washington or elsewhere to his heart's content.

I don't know if I was right about this. To be sure, when the State department asked again, and the Canadian Government replied, this was the line that was taken. But that is beside the point. What interests me -- and what I hope has also interested you -- is that even before the first Canadian note was dispatched, Canadians, from coast to coast, were showing every sign of wanting to tell the Americans to go jump in the lake. Their inclination was increased by certain reactions in the United States. A paper like the New York Mirror, for instance, was demanding that Canada "yield Gouzenko", and I am using quotes. This made almost every Canadian who was vocal say that Canada, under no circumstance, should yield this unfortunate gent, just as if, in the last analysis, we could prevent Gouzenko yielding himself, if he wanted to be yielded. Newspapers from the Pacific to the Atlantic were publishing editorials saying that the Government should not permit the committee to have Gouzenko as a witness; and the mythical man in the street (whoever he may be) was equally emphatic. There was, indeed, a certain amount of genuine regret when the Government, in its second note, did suggest that, under certain conditions and safeguards, it would be glad to make arrangements for Senator Jenner to interview Gouzenko. One of the conditions made was that there would be no unrestricted publicity, a condition which appeared to cool Senator Jenner off, in spite of his