

ed. As a direct result of this state of things, free enlistment becomes impossible, since men, who may appear unwilling to enter into, or adhere to, the above-mentioned contract, are naturally regarded as undesirable recruits, however eligible they may be for military service. There appears little doubt that the volunteer system is the best adapted to the conditions existing in the large cities. By adopting the principle in its entirety, and giving the force of law to a system which now exists only by mutual consent between officers and men, a great benefit would be conferred on the city corps. The volunteer system is no new departure in Canada. It dates back to a time anterior to the Militia Act. An error was undoubtedly committed in attempting to blend incongruous elements under one Act, and one set of militia regulations.

The Rural Militia would likewise benefit by such a change. There is, in that category, the best possible material for a national defensive force, and to it the militia system is alone applicable.

An effect of the existing anomaly is to make both categories of the Militia dependent for their pay, on a single vote in militia estimates, without distinction as to the manner in which that pay is earned.

It appears to have been assumed, that circumstances require the pay granted under that vote to be divided in a proportion, which bears no relation to the comparative strength of the two categories. Thus in the current year, the proportion of Vote No. 100 in the Militia estimates, allotted as pay to each category, has been:

To rural corps	41 p. c. of the whole sum
To city corps	34 do do

or a difference of one-tenth only in favour of the rural corps. The disadvantage under which rural corps labour is sufficiently evident, when it is remembered that their established strength exceeds that of city corps, in the proportion of 3 to 1. It is a disadvantage, moreover, which is annually increasing, by the creation of new city corps. A striking instance of this appears in No. 2 Military District, where in the past year the city militia has been increased by 10 companies, representing an annual charge for drill pay of \$3,736.48. Under the present system, this sum must be withdrawn from the rural battalions, whose annual quota for drill is thereby proportionately reduced. The only manner in which this defect can be remedied, is by separating the two categories of Active Militia (as already suggested) placing the annual vote for pay under sub-heads answering to those categories, and attaching thereto the establishment list of each. This manner of dealing with pay is found necessary, not only in England, but in countries where the right of Parliament to control expenditure, is less fully recognised.

TRAINING.

Appendices F, G, H, I, of this report deal with the training of the Militia in the

past year. Some changes have been introduced by me which I trust, as they become understood and developed, will lead to a more practical form of instruction, and a better employment of the short time available for drill.

The relative degree of efficiency of the three arms in the Active Militia is as follows:—

Artillery	1
Cavalry	2
Infantry	3

The inferiority in every respect of the last, and most important arm, is very marked. The report of the Inspector of Engineers (Appendix L) contains some practical suggestions, for the reorganization of the so-called Engineer companies. I fully concur in the opinion he expresses. At present no corps of military Engineers can be said to exist in Canada; but, as pointed out by Major Mayne, the population of certain districts could provide probably the finest material in the world, from which to organize Pioneer Battalions.

The superiority of the Artillery, and the marked inferiority of the Infantry, are traceable to the same cause, viz., the manner in which the duty of inspection is carried out. In the Artillery, the system instituted by General Strange, when Inspector of Artillery, and still efficiently carried out, makes the inspection at once a test of efficiency, a means of instruction and a source of emulation. The inspection of the other arms has degenerated into a mere parade or review, which is productive of no good results at all, but, on the contrary, frequently directs the efforts of commanding officers into a wrong channel. The encouragement of a spirit of emulation, in real efficiency and not in mere show, is most desirable. The thanks of the whole Militia force are due to Colonel Sir Casimir Gzowski, A. D. C., for the prizes which he has instituted with this object.

Another cause which tends to give a superiority to the Artillery is the fact that the majority of the officers and non-commissioned officers of that arm, having attended the Schools of Artillery, have been well grounded in the first principles of their duty. They are consequently more capable of imparting systematic instruction than are the officers of other arms.

1. *City Militia.* As regards military training, city corps are at a great disadvantage. They acquire the forms of drill in the drill shed, but have no means of learning their practical application. It is very desirable that an appropriation should be made annually in the estimates of a sum, in aid of the efforts now made by individual corps, to remedy this disadvantage. The pecuniary sacrifices, involved by such efforts, are too great to be borne by all corps, and a certain proportion of the burden should be taken by the Government, if real efficiency is to be secured.

Another cause of inefficiency in city

corps, is the small establishment of the lower ranks. A reference to the inspection returns (Appendix J) will show the disproportion existing between the number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and undrilled details (*i. e.*, bandsmen, &c.); and combatant rank and file. In some Battalions, the entire number of privates would barely suffice to make one real company. In the event of national emergency there exists no ready means of completing these skeleton Battalions to the strength of effective tactical units.

The adoption of the volunteer principal (as I have advocated) would reduce this difficulty, by making it possible to organize a volunteer reserve for each Battalion. The feeling of *esprit de corps* is so strong, that the privilege of being allowed to earn a small capitation-grant annually, for the corps, with which they had been three years connected, would, I believe, be sufficient inducement to Volunteers to comply with such easy conditions as would be imposed, and to keep the reserve full of drilled men, ready at any time to step into their places if required. Every Battalion should have issued to it the arms and accoutrements for its full or war strength. The custody of arms so distributed would not entail a heavier expenditure on the Government, than does the present system, and a great source of confusion would be removed, in the case of an emergency.

2. *Rural Militia.* The rural corps are very deficient in instruction, but their organization is still more defective. The former want could be partly made good by an increase in the estimates, but the latter would remain a bar to real efficiency, whatever the amount of money voted. Under the headings of "Allowances" and "Arms and Accoutrements" I have touched upon some of those points in the existing system, which are the cause of considerable expenditure, without producing an equivalent benefit, while in Appendix G (General Order dated 24th December, 1891) I have referred to some of the irregularities in recruiting, that are of common occurrence. A further cause of considerable unnecessary expense is the manner in which the sites of district camps are annually changed.

The remarks attached to Appendix F show, in men and miles, the amount of unnecessary transport, besides other disadvantages, involved this year by this practice. A very simple calculation will suffice to show its costliness.

Under the system hitherto followed, no data are available on which to base a trustworthy estimate of the cost incidental to the training of the Rural Militia, but it is my belief that a considerably large force could be annually trained than has hitherto been the case, without any increase in the vote for drill and training. I am not prepared at present to recommend any such increase of expenditure. I am satisfied that in the past, the results obtained