

## CONTENTS OF No. 35, VOL. VII.

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| POETRY.—                                   |     |
| Out West .....                             | 118 |
| EDITORIALS.—                               |     |
| The Strategy of Invasion .....             | 114 |
| The U. S. Press on the Canadian Army ..... | 115 |
| Dinner to the late Adjutant General .....  | 116 |
| Dinner to the Canadian Volunteers .....    | 116 |
| Departure of Colonel Robertson Ross .....  | 117 |
| The News of the Week .....                 | 119 |
| RIFLE COMPETITION.—                        |     |
| Province of Quebec Rifle Association ..... | 119 |
| Ottawa Brigade Garrison Artillery .....    | 119 |
| SELECTIONS.—                               |     |
| Selontine Warfare .....                    | 112 |
| The British Navy .....                     | 112 |
| Miscellaneous .....                        | 112 |
| Camp of Instruction at Dartmoor .....      | 117 |
| The Dartmoor Camp of Exercise .....        | 118 |
| General News .....                         | 120 |
| REVIEWS .....                              | 1   |



# The Volunteer Review,

AND

## MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE.

"Unbribed, unbought, our swords we draw,  
To guard the Monarch, fence the Law."

OTTAWA, TUESDAY, SEPT. 9, 1873.

To CORRESPONDENTS.—Letters addressed to either the Editor or Publisher, as well as Communications intended for publication, must, invariably, be *pre-paid*. Correspondents will also bear in mind that one end of the envelope should be left open, and at the corner the words "Printer's copy" written, and a two or five cent stamp (according to the weight of the communication) placed thereon will pay the postage.

WHILE General SHERMAN was marching triumphantly through North Carolina, the last act in the great war drama before Richmond was being played out. The *hammer* process had at last been successful against a military force which had gallantly and triumphantly resisted till its numerical strength was worn away, and the successful *strategy of invasion* had rendered reinforcements or supply impossible. It is a question which does not admit of doubt that, if General GRANT's idea of transporting Gen. SHERMAN's army by sea to Peterburgh or to any point on the lines surrounding Richmond had been carried out, the 2nd of April, 1865, would not have seen those lines forced and the Confederate cause lost beyond hope. Richmond was evacuated on the night of that day, and on the 7th General LEE surrendered the remains of the army which had so long defended it.

On the 10th of April, General SHERMAN advanced in two columns by both banks of the Neuse River, and entered Smithfield on the 11th to find that JOHNSTON's forces had crossed the river, and that Gen. LEE had

surrendered. This intelligence at once led him to abandon his trains and all other *impedimenta*, push forward at once on Raleigh, and endeavour to cut off the retreat of the Confederates on Charlotte. General JOHNSTON, hopeless and unwilling to disband his army, surrendered on the 13th of April; and thus a contest of four years' duration was brought to a close, after an expenditure of between three and four thousand millions of dollars and over one and a half millions of lives!

The lessons to be derived from the whole contest are centred around the *great marches*. That from Nashville to the sea is deserving of close attention, as it exemplifies in an extraordinary degree the practical application of *grand tactics* to the art of war. It is true that these tactics as practised were adapted to novel conditions, because the advance in every case was made under cover and by regular approach, as in siege operations, and the most scientific manoeuvre never aspired to any result beyond that to be obtained by turning a flank. Engagements in the open field was not to be thought of, as the general action of 27th June, 1864, plainly shewed; but, nevertheless, it argued a high state of discipline when the beaten Federal troops on that occasion could be extended under cover so as to compel the victorious Confederates to abandon a position so well adapted for defensive purposes and so bravely held.

The actions and manoeuvres between Nashville and Atlanta, and the means whereby the latter important position was captured, will always be a glorious page in the military annals of the United States, reflecting great honour on the soldiers, generals, and the military training of their schools. To the student in the art of war it will be, at least on this continent, a far more useful and instructive text-book than any of the late events since furnished by better appointed armies on the continent of Europe; and we have no hesitation in placing Gen. SHERMAN on the same standing that the Prussian Count, VON MOLTE, now occupies as a strategist and tactician. From Atlanta the *march to the sea* was little more than a problem of the science of Logistics. Its successful solution only proves what has been claimed for the general who planned it—although it is a question whether he quite understood its ultimate effects on his own and on the Confederate cause. What ever may have been the true state of the case, there can be no doubt that his successful occupation of Savannah at once opened his eyes to the value of a similar march along the rear of the successive defences and reserves through South and North Carolina, which was not appreciated by Gen. GRANT.

The similarity of these operations to those practised eighty three years before by Earl CORNWALLIS with a British army led to the present review of both movements, and as

the greater interest necessarily centred in the most recent of the two, little more was done than enumerate the British line of march, which was nearly identical with Gen. SHERMAN's through the Carolinas and in Georgia. Their operations reached to Augusta and beyond what was to be the site of Atlanta. The actual force in the field never at any time exceeded two thousand five hundred men, and frequently not even half as many; yet in the face of a well-organized opposition, that army kept the field for over twelve months, crushed all opposition, and finally surrendered to a vastly superior force, some hundreds of miles in advance of SHERMAN's furthest.

The strategy of invasion was the same in both cases,—the object being to destroy available resources centring in the same localities, the Province of Virginia and the State of the same name being the only difference: the chief base of operations being, in the first case, New York—in the latter, Washington; the assailants in both cases having the command of the sea board, with this advantage for General SHERMAN—that he was in no danger of contemplated foreign or other interference, while CORNWALLIS was at any time liable to attack from a French fleet—an assistance denied the Confederates, and which would have rendered the *march to the sea* or through the Carolinas an impossibility.

General SHERMAN appears to have followed the course of events, and with the appreciation of true genius turned each opportunity to account. Earl CORNWALLIS started on a well-devised plan, embracing every step he subsequently took and every movement made. He provided his own means of transport, and with troops that *did not fight under cover*, opposed to levies that were presumed to know all about that operation, he was invariably successful. If the difference of time, the state of the country, the distance of the base of supply, the difference in the mode of transport, and the much smaller force at the disposal of the British General, be taken into consideration, it will be found that in no case will his character as a commander suffer in comparing it with that of General SHERMAN; and while allowing the latter all the honour his undoubted ability demands, it should be borne in mind that he had the value of the experience of the British General over a far more difficult field to profit by.

That the final result was different was no fault of his. At any time after the action of Guilford Court House or the battle of Camden, Sir HENRY CLINTON could, by a forward movement from New York, have annihilated WASHINGTON's army precisely as GRANT annihilated LEE's; and even if he had followed the combined French and United States' troops to Yorktown, the disgrace of reconing that capitulation would have been spared the military annals of Great Britain, or if Admiral GRAVES had not