THE FRENCH BAR.

Sketches of two eminent French barristers, members of the Corps Legislatif, have been furnished to an evening contemporary. This is M. Berryer:—"It is singular that this great master of the art of oratory never addresses an audience without being seized during the first few moments of his speech with the same kind of trembling which Mirabeau confessed he invariably experienced under similar circumstances. No sooner, however, is he fairly embarked in his subject than this nervous feeling vanishes, and instead of quailing, as it were, before his audience, he appears to hold them in complete subjection. He rarely notices an interruption, but when he does it is with a disagreeable rejoinder, which at once insures silence. However intricate the question under discussion may be, he never refers to either documents or notes. His memory is the sole storehouse whence he draws his facts and illustrations, always apposite and always produced at the proper moment. He is perfectly indifferent as to the way in which his speeches are reported, and never has any intercourse with the short-hand writers of the Chamber, and, least of all, never troubles himself, like many of his colleagues, to read a proof of the report of his speech which is to appear in the *Moniteur* of the following morning." Of M. Jules Favre it is said that his "insinuating voice, eloquent academic language, gracefully rounded periods, and persuasive style of delivery, distinguish him alike at the Bar and in the Tribune. There is no man in France of whom the Democratic party are more proud, and there is certainly no man among the party of the same extreme opinions who are listened to with such attention and respect by his opponents in the Corps Legislatif. When, perhaps, some conversational discussion is going on which does not oblige the speaker to address the Chamber from the tribune, you may chance to see rise up from the fourth row of benches a man of commanding and well-developed figure, whose grey hair and white pointed beard give character to his grave-looking countenance. No sooner does he open his lips, even though he may be speaking on the most ordinary topic, than you feel interested, and it is impossible to listen to him for any length of time without being fascinated by his eloquent language, and calm, insinuating voice and manner.—"*English Paper.*

INTERRUPTION BY JUDGES.

A good story is going the round of the Chancery Bar. An eminent counsel recently spoke for two hours before one of the Vice-Chancelors, and the proceedings were reported *verbatim* by a short hand writer. It appears from his notes, that the judge interrupted the barrister precisely one hundred and thirteen times,—almost exactly once in every minute. This practice of interruption, at least in two of the equity courts, has now reached such an excess, that those tribunals are almost incessantly the scenes of indecorous wrangling or gossip, and the administration of justice is seriously impeded. The established rule with respect to the hearing a cause is logical, convenient and just. First, the party on whom the *onus probandi* lies is heard; next, his opponent; then there is a right of reply; and lastly, the court delivers judgment. That rule has prevailed for centuries; and it exists as a matter of right in every tribunal in the kingdom, whether of legal, equitable, criminal or ecclesiastical jurisdiction. It may be presumed, therefore that a usage so well established has been found beneficial. If counsel might not be heard without interruption, the next step would be not to hear at all. The evil has now grown so great in the two courts to which we refer, that counsel find connected and close argument nearly impossible, and hence they are forced into the bad habit of substituting short exclamatory sgggestions. Considering the difficulty and intricacy of the subjects with which the Court of Chancery has to deal, it is obvious that this virtual prohibition of close forensic reasoning is a serious loss to the suitors. Nor should it be forgotten that the right of audience belongs to the suitor, and not to the counsel, who is his mouthpiece.—*English Paper.*

TELEGRAMS.

Vice-Chancellor Giffard has held in *Coupland* v. *Arrowsmith*, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 755 that a telegram is admissable in evidence as a letter, if it be properly authenticated. It was objected that, as an advertisement was inadmissible as not being under the signature or in the hand-writing of the party, so also should be a telegram, which is neither written nor signed by the sender. But it was answered that a telegram is a message by A. to B.; unlike an advertisement, which is a general notice, it differs from a letter only in this, that the sender writes it by the hand of the telegraph clerk, as he might write a letter by his secretary. But it must be authenticated, of course.

The question, therefore, arises, what is a sufficient authentication of a telegram?

To answer this, let us see what is required to be proved. It is that the message came from B. the alleged sender of it. The written instructions for messages are, we believe preserved at the telegraph offices. The first step will be to procure this document, and ascertain by whom it was written. If by B. himself, the production of it, with proof of handwriting, will suffice; but if written by another, that other must be found, and his authority, and so backward until it is traced to B. But if, as must frequently happen, it is impossible to ascertain whose hand wrote the message, or who brought it, there remain only two courses; either to call B. himself to prove it, and when