

countable. He is, therefore, of course, able to decide independent of God, or of grace. "The very act of God imparting this self-determining principle renders it impossible in the nature of things for the Almighty himself to elect him unconditionally."—He can do so only upon the condition that man does not choose to resist all possible divine influences !

Now if all this be true—if man has any such power—if its existence and exercise are essential to his accountability, where is the room for grace in his salvation ? He has a just claim, according to Wesley, to the provision and offer of salvation, and to the strength necessary to receive it. There is no grace, therefore, in bestowing these upon him. God could not justly do less. And having these, he has, in his "self-determining principle," power to resist all the grace that God can bestow on him afterwards ! Nay, more "his self-determining principle," which is said to be essential to free agency, forbids that there should be any influence whatever exerted upon him in his decision. If there is, how is it the act of "his self-determining principle ?" The very phrase, "a self-determining principle," decided by grace, *i.e.*, by something independent of itself, is an absurdity as gross and palpable as it would be to speak of a self-moving machine propelled by something else. In the face of this mighty principle, there is neither room nor occasion for grace, in the sinner's self-determination, to submit to God. He can do it himself, otherwise his "self-determining principle" cannot determine itself after all. And he must do it himself, otherwise his "self-determining" principle is not self-determined, and his accountability is gone. It amounts to this, then, that he can resist all influences—he can keep God out of his heart, or he can, without any influence, magnanimously open the door, and permit the Almighty to enter. Thus again does Arminianism subvert grace by making man able either to dispense with it altogether, or superior to its most potent influences.

There is, connected with this dogma of a self-determining principle, a rich display of theologico-metaphysical acuteness, which is worthy of notice. Where does man get this wonderful principle ? It does not belong to him by nature ; nor is it a necessary or inherent power of the mind (although Dr. Fisk says there can be no accountability without it !), for the General Conference says, "that in the moment Adam fell, he had no freedom of will left,"—of course his "self-determining principle" was destroyed with his freedom of will, though his mind still existed. The same is true of his posterity. Whence then do they obtain it ? We are not left to guess. In immediate connection with the above declaration as to Adam, and as a part indeed of the same sentence, the Conference proceeds, "but that God, when