

out by the Conventional Armaments Commission, to exchange information on national armaments, as a first step to working out an agreement on balanced disarmament. This proposal contained a provision for verification of the information, by international inspection. This provision was attacked by the Soviet Delegation on the grounds that it would amount to international espionage and an infringement of national sovereignty.

Our position is that the only kind of inspection which will be adequate to convince people that international control plans and policy are observed is that which gives far-reaching powers to the inspectors, while providing against the abuse of those powers. They, the inspectors, will be the agents of the international conscience and the international community, and no government, which is sincere in this matter of international control of atomic energy, as we all are, would want to restrict or restrain them so that they could not discharge their duties efficiently.

There is another principle in our resolution, and I am talking not only of broad principles, which does, I admit, involve a derogation from national sovereignty. Our resolution says that national control and operation of atomic energy facilities is a danger to humanity. Believing this, we agree that there should be international operation. This aspect of the subject will, no doubt, be thoroughly discussed in this debate. Here I would merely state that if, notwithstanding the special danger from the ease by which atomic energy can be diverted from productive to destructive use, it can be shown that national operation with complete 100 per cent inspection would not be a menace to security, then we should be glad to re-examine the position. So far, after many months of hard and detailed study, we have not been convinced that this is the case. I would point out also that international operation and management is not the same as ownership, in the individual or national meaning of that word. The international operating agency would be the trustee of the nations who had agreed by treaty to its establishment and to its powers, and it would distribute the products of its operations for peaceful use in a manner determined by treaty or convention.

It is, I suggest, absurd to argue - as the Soviet Delegation has argued - that such renunciations of national sovereignty - if you wish to call them that - are a sacrifice or a humiliation to any state which believes in international co-operation and collective security.

Acceptance by agreement of international control and operation of atomic energy facilities and full international inspection to ensure that agreements made are being carried out, that is no surrender of anything. On the contrary, it is a great step forward towards confidence and peace. This is not losing sovereignty; it is using sovereignty. It is not a loss; it is a gain. To think and to act otherwise is to fly in the face of all the experience of this century, where the progress we have made has been in the direction of widening the area of international authority. Our very presence here today proves that.

Insistence on reactionary concepts of sovereignty is not good enough in the modern world and it has been expressly disavowed in the last paragraph of our resolution which pledges all nations to renounce the "individual exercise of such rights of national sovereignty in the control of atomic energy as are incompatible with the promotion of world security and peace". World security, everyone now admits, requires international control of atomic energy and by our resolution, rights of national