

forces. Ideas about peace (in the Arab Middle East, for example) can range from notions of cease-fires, to temporary cessations of hostilities, to non-belligerency, to "real peace" and so on.<sup>24</sup> This implies that it is more useful to analyze the impact of political culture through two other lenses that are both more concrete, and more pertinent to this analysis.

The first concrete manifestation of political cultural influences is the impact of particular institutional and legal arrangements on political outcomes. The legalist and contractual bent of American politics (reflecting the importance of the Supreme Court, and the court system as a means of conflict resolution); the incorporation of factional and ideological differences within a ruling "consensus" in Japan, the role of a professional and "non-partisan" civil service in Westminster parliamentary systems, or the colonial heritage of imposed political systems that efface traditional patterns of accommodation and conflict resolution can all have real consequences in the security arena. For example, in the early 1980s, the Reagan Administration's deliberate intransigence on arms control produced a Congressional revolt that succeeded in imposing several changes on the American position in the INF and START negotiations. This reflected the relative balance of Congress and the president in foreign policy making and treaty-signing. It served, however, to confuse completely the Soviet negotiators, who were uncertain about which voice spoke for the American government, and about the value of any negotiating statements or positions.<sup>25</sup> Likewise, throughout the 1970s the Egyptian government, with a different tradition of rule, "tended to underestimate the limits on presidential power," and perhaps "exaggerated [their] American interlocutors' freedom of action" in various negotiating forums.<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, an awareness of the factional nature of Japanese politics allowed Chinese negotiators in the early 1970s to "test" the extent to which Japanese (and Liberal Democratic Party) policy had really changed as a result of its normalization of relations with China.<sup>27</sup>

The second manifestation of political cultural elements are the external expressions or projections of these domestic political arrangements and traditions. At a trivial level, this can lead to diplomatic gaffes and embarrassments: it was often noted, for example, that President Lyndon Johnson, schooled in senatorial log-rolling "treated Third World leaders like Senators...[and] presumed that they were all reasonable men who could be persuaded to compromise on almost any issue if the right combination of threats and incentives was employed."<sup>28</sup> At a more important level, multilateral practice, and indeed much behaviour in the international arena, can reflect domestic political experiences and innovations. The entire architecture and institutional arrangements of the post-World War II multilateral order, for example, was the outward projection of the New Deal state, and reflected closely the Rooseveltian regulatory revolution in American political life, in such areas as the Food and Agriculture or World Health Organizations, or

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<sup>24</sup> See details in the chapter by Gabriel Ben-Dor in this collection.

<sup>25</sup> Details are discussed in Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, (London: Pan Books, 1985), 330-342.

<sup>26</sup> Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures*, 97.

<sup>27</sup> Ogura Kazuo, "How the 'Inscrutables' Negotiate with the 'Inscrutables,': Chinese Negotiating Tactics vis-à-vis the Japanese," *China Quarterly*, 79 (September 1979), 530-532.

<sup>28</sup> Former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, quoted in Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures*, 34.