

Like the normal arrangements for regular auditing of a reputable commercial enterprise, verification should be designed to be able to detect non-compliance, whether due to inefficiency, or intentional violation. A verification regime which is totally dependent on a high degree of cooperation could be dangerously vulnerable in times of deteriorating relations.

Most discussions of verification have been in terms of a particular agreement, negotiated among participants of equal status, and containing carefully worded provisions for verification. In view of the increase of violence in the post-Cold War world, the experience in Iraq, the serious troubles in the Balkans, the instability in other parts of Eurasia, and the rejuvenated willingness of the United Nations and possibly other multinational organizations to restore or establish peace by the presence or actual use of force, it is quite possible that a somewhat different type of arms control and disarmament (perhaps better described as "demilitarization") will become necessary. It would be imposed by a legally authorized international body on an unwilling party, but with clearly defined terms as to which armaments are permitted and which forbidden. Such a requirement would need to be verified, but it would be desirable to keep to a minimum the degree of intrusion, and to try to make it effective without depending on whole-hearted cooperation by the inspected party.

Thus there is a spectrum of conditions under which verification may be needed. It extends from cooperative through adversarial to coercive verification. In circumstances of good trust and cooperation among willing participants there should be few problems.

With deteriorating to poor relations among parties, who have entered into agreements, but are prepared to carry them out only to the minimum legal extent required by the agreement, or perhaps somewhat less than this, and perhaps accompanied by deception and evasion, there is an adversarial situation, but it is between equals bound by an obligation.

The extreme case, is a one-sided situation between a powerful coalition with a high degree of international authority (eg the UN) and a rogue state (or states) which has been acting in a way to endanger international security, and had been ordered by the international authority to divest itself of some (or all) of its armaments. In these circumstances, instead of verification of adherence to a negotiated treaty, the problem will be to discover to what extent the rogue state is complying with the orders to disarm, whether or not it has agreed so to do, and whether or not it cooperates with the verification.

An example of verification in an adversarial situation has been provided by the experience of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the IAEA in Iraq. Since it arose from conditions imposed by the victors on the losers of a war, it differs from the circumstances of a treaty voluntarily agreed by all participants, in conditions of peaceful (though not necessarily friendly) negotiations. Nevertheless, it illustrates the difficulties encountered by inspectors when the inspected party employs concealment, evasion, and deception in order to prevent discovery of its armaments and the capabilities of its facilities. It also has demonstrated the importance of synergy in combining the results of observations from satellites, aircraft (including U-2 sorties), helicopters, on-site inspections, and information from defectors as well as from the Iraqi authorities.

The failure of the IAEA safeguards inspections to discover the extent of the Iraqi program to acquire nuclear weapons demonstrates the need for challenge inspections of undeclared sites. But lacking any intelligence capability of its own, the IAEA can only rely on synergy to select sites worthy of challenge. With the concern for nuclear proliferation growing, similar situations can be foreseen in other parts of the world, under conditions more likely to be adversarial or coercive than cooperative.

