

It also sets out some of the areas where the government considers progress necessary for promoting non-proliferation, such as the promotion of regional fuel cycles. These are described in the background paper. The standard does not, as Canada would have wished, stipulate that safeguards be applied to the full nuclear programme of the recipient country. Such a requirement is not, however, precluded and achievement of a consensus on this question may be a future result of efforts in the suppliers' group.

I have just given an exposition of Canada's position. This position, or policy is, of course, shared by the other supplier countries concerned about the problem. As the Prime Minister has stated, however, there has been no secret agreement or binding international treaty enforcing this standard. What there has been as a result of consultation among senior technical officials, is a consensus decision expressed in unilateral form by a number of countries to accept certain safeguards principles in all cases of nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapon states, whether party to the N.P.T. or not. More countries are likely, on the basis of review, to make such a decision.

The Canadian Government has pressed, in its discussions, for the highest possible level of safeguards to be applied to all nuclear transfer. We are satisfied that much progress has been made as a result of this effort and that further progress can be made. It is one further stage in the evolution of the international safeguards system. The London Club conclusions, as the suppliers' meetings have been called, have been a success. We have covered one of the difficulties that is encountered by a single country acting alone.