

in the South African state, and there are significant political actors who advocate more cautious tactics than others, this fundamental bottom line is shared by the constellation of institutions, interests, factions and actors the present state comprises. It can be seen as the underlying element in both domestic and regional policies. Here it should be emphasized that the direction and conflicts of domestic politics since 1984, and particularly the successful suppression of the 18 month urban black uprising, have also reinforced this perception.

Finally, the developing institutional structure of decision-making in South Africa leads to even more marked rigidity in regional (and domestic policy), and reinforces the tendency to rely exclusively on the exercise of military and economic power. Since 1978 P.W. Botha has re-organized the South African state in such a way as to institutionalize the military and other security apparatuses as by far the most influential elements in both the decision-making and administrative structures of the state.

Conclusions

If the thrust of this analysis is correct, it implies that the possibility of moving towards a "security regime" in which South Africa participates will be contingent on changing these regional imbalances.

It also assumes that this cannot be achieved through "learning cooperation." South Africa's willful and systematic violation of the 1984 Nkomati Accords with Mozambique²--under conditions which made it possible for Pretoria to realize some of its longstanding foreign policy objectives³--points to a profound inability to learn even under the most propitious circumstances.

² A "Non Agression and Good Neighbourliness Pact," signed on March 15, 1984. For evidence of Pretoria's ongoing violation of the Accord, see evidence of US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, to "Hearing on Mozambique and United States Policy." Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 24 June 1987, pp. 168-171.

³ See R. Davies and D. O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978," Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 11, 2 April 1985, pp. 207.