

negotiation, and also how Canada was able to enhance its own bargaining power so as to achieve its own goals more completely. Allow me to elaborate a bit on this last point. In the area of subsidies and countervailing duties, Canada and the EEC both had an interest in the United States' agreeing to cease levying countervailing duties on subsidized imports until evidence had first been shown, in accordance with GATT requirements, that its industry had suffered injury. The fact that the EEC and Canada were able to exert combined pressure on the U.S. went a long way towards achieving this priority goal for Canada - a goal also shared by Japan and the developing countries. On the other hand, Canada and the U.S. also had some common interests with respect to this area of the negotiations, since both sought greater discipline relative to export subsidies, especially as concerns agricultural products.

There are dozens of other examples in the non-tariff negotiations which one could cite to illustrate the fact that we were able to join forces with various countries to achieve the results sought despite resistance from one or other of the participants. It was indeed rare that we were faced with a situation where the Big Three, the United States, the EEC and Japan, worked in monolithic fashion in directions contrary to our interests. And when