

require more careful consideration than can be given within the short space of time at our disposal during a regular session. Even more important is the fact that many of these items require preparatory work by way of study and investigations between sessions to enable delegations to form considered judgments. Finally the full membership of the United Nations should be concerned to know from month to month whether or not the more important recommendations which it has embodied in its resolutions are being observed. In the course of a regular session, the Assembly adopts many resolutions, some of which are of great importance. It would be desirable to have between sessions a committee specifically charged with observing and reporting on the implementation of the most important of these resolutions.

There remains the question: Are we entitled to take action of the kind we contemplate? Is it legal and constitutional? Serious questions have been raised in this connection, and we should not dismiss them lightly. The only limitations which we face are the provisions of Articles 12 and 24. In our opinion and in spite of dogmatic but unsupported statements to the contrary, the U.S. proposal does not contravene either of these Articles. On the contrary, it falls within that provision of the Charter, Article 22, which provides for the establishment of subsidiary organs of the Assembly. Assertions, therefore, that in accepting the principle of the U.S. proposal we are breaking the Charter are without foundation. Their constant repetition does not make them more convincing. The intention at San Francisco was to provide in the Assembly an instrument with the necessary power and flexibility for the performance of the important duties assigned to it.

There are, of course, other ways within the Charter by which the General Assembly could fulfil the continuing responsibilities which we think it should discharge. The General Assembly might, by simple adjustments in the Rules of Procedure, be kept in session throughout the year, meeting as the occasion required. It would be possible also for us to depend on special sessions of the Assembly, and there is the third expedient establishing a committee of the whole Assembly to meet between regular sessions. There are advantages and disadvantages to be found in each of these methods. We have been led to the conclusion, however, that an Interim Committee is the method best suited in the circumstances for developing the functions of the Assembly in the manner which we are contemplating.

The terms of reference to be given to such a committee must be studied carefully. We do not agree entirely with those which have been suggested in the United States resolution and for this reason have submitted (in Document A/C. 1/217) certain amendments to that proposal. It seems to the Canadian delegation that there are important functions which might be performed by an Interim Committee and which are not mentioned in the proposal before us. The United States delegate, himself, in introducing his proposal, referred to the important duties which an Interim Committee might perform in preparing the way for regular session of the General Assembly. He has not, however, made provision for performance of these duties in the resolution which he has presented. It seems to us also that the Interim Committee should consider the extent to which the more important resolutions of the General Assembly are being carried out. We realize that these resolutions are no more than recommendations to member nations. They are, however, expressions of international opinion which must carry